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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The trial court entered its Ruling and Order denying Brooke Robinson's (hereinafter 
"Mother") Rule 59 Motion to Amend Order on April 30, 2015. Rec. 1238. Mother timely 
filed her Notice of Appeal on May 21, 2015. Rec. 1241. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant 
to Utah Code § 78A-4-l 03(2)(h). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Issue: Did the trial court err in granting the Respondent's (hereinafter 
"Father") motion to dismiss Mother's petition and specifically, in finding that Utah's courts 
did not have jurisdiction under the Utah Unifonn Child Custody Jurisdiction and 
Enforcement Act (hereinafter "UUCCJEA"), Utah Code § 78B-l 3-101 et seq. (2008), to 
adjudicate the issues contained in Mother's petition? 
a. Standard of Review. "Both jurisdictional questions and questions of 
statutory interpretation are questions of law that we review for correctness." In re P.F.B., 
2008 UT App 271, 191 P.3d 49; Meyeres v. Meyeres, 2008 UT App 364, 196 P.3d 604,606. 
b. Preservation Below. Mother contended throughout the proceeding that 
the court had jurisdiction to hear the Petition under the UUCCJEA and that the order 
dismissing the case based upon the lack of jurisdiction was error. Rec. 272, 381, 386, 937 
and 944. 
2. Issue: Did the trial court err in concluding, without an evidentiary hearing 
and without communicating with the courts in Mexico, that at the time of the filing of the 
Petition in this case, there were existing orders and continuing child custody proceedings in 
Mexico and that Mother had engaged in unjustifiable misconduct by leaving Mexico with the 
children and changing her name in response to mental and physical abuse by Father? 
a. Standard of Review. ''Both jurisdictional questions and questions of 
statutory interpretation are questions of law that we review for correctness." In re P.F.B., 
2008 UT App 2 71, 191 P .3d 49; Meyeres v. Meyeres, 2008 UT App 3 64, 196 P .3d 604, 606. 
Only if it is clear that the claimant is not entitled to relief under any state of facts that could 
be proven to support the claim should a motion to dismiss be granted. Colman v. Utah State 
Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990); Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78, P9, 99 P.3d 
842, 846, 508 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah 2004). 
b. Preservation Below. Mother repeatedly contended that, at the time the 
petition was filed, there were no simultaneous custody proceedings pending in Mexico and 
that the previously entered orders issued in Mexico's courts relating to the children had been 
rescinded and vacated by the issuing court. Rec. 272, 381, 386, 937 and 944. 
3. Issue: Did the court err in failing to make sufficient findings of fact to support 
its conclusion that the provisions of the UUCCJEA precluded the exercise of jurisdiction in 
this matter, that there were simultaneous custody proceedings pending in Mexico and that 
Mother had engaged in unjustifiable misconduct? 
a. Standard of Review. For findings of fact to be adequate, they "must 
show that the com1's judgment or decree 'follows logically from, and is supported by, the 
evidence.' The findings 'should be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts 
to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached."' 
2 
Acton v. Deliran, 73 7 P .2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) ( emphasis added) ( citations omitted); 
Armed Forces Ins. Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, il 28, 70 P.3d 35, 43. 
b. Preservation Below. Mother argued that the court had failed to set out 
sufficient findings to identify the evidence upon which it was relying to establish that there 
were simultaneous custody proceedings pending in Mexico at the time Mother filed her 
Petition in this case. Rec. 93 7, 944. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW 
The following sections of the UUCCJEA are attached in Addendum G: Utah Code 
§ 78B-13-102 (definitions);§ 78B-13-110 (communication between courts),§ 78B-13-112 
( cooperation between courts); § 78B-13-201 (initial jurisdiction); § 78B-13-206 
( simultaneous proceedings); § 78B-13-208 (jurisdiction declined by reason of conduct); and 
§ 78B-13-209 (Infonnation to be submitted to court). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case & Course of the Proceedings Below 
Mother commenced this action seeking orders related to the custody, maintenance 
and support of the parties' two minor children. Although the parties have been separated 
since November 2007, there are no currently enforceable orders in place, either in Mexico 
or the United States, regarding the custody of the minor children or provisions thereof 
providing for their maintenance and support. Additionally, there are currently no orders in 
place protecting Mother and children from the psychological, physical and emotional 
vb misconduct of Father. 
3 
This appeal arises from a final order upholding the recommendation of the domestic 
relations commissioner dismissing the Mother's petition for custody related orders based ~ 
upon a lack of jurisdiction under the provisions of the UUCCJEA. Specifically, the 
commissioner held that at the time the petition was filed in this case, there were pending 
custody proceedings in Mexico; and, even if Utah had jurisdiction, Mother had engaged in 
unjustifiable misconduct justifying Utah's refusal to exercise jurisdiction in the matter. 
On November 18, 2013, Mother filed her petition requesting the entry of custody and 
related orders pertaining to the parties' minor children. Rec. 1-57. 
In her petition, Mother alleged that the parties were married on June 26, 1999 and that ~ 
as issue of the marriage, two children were born: S.M.L., born May 2001, and R.M.L, born 
November 2003. Rec. 1-57. 
Mother alleged that Father, in November 2007, instituted an action for divorce in a 
court in Mexico which produced a number of orders related to custody, the last significant 
of which was the order of June 30, 2010, granting Mother sole custody or "custodia 
definitiva" (See Addendum A, pp. 4-6; Addendum E). Both parties appealed the June 30th 
order and while that original divorce/custody case was on appeal, Father filed a separate 
action with another court in Mexico, seeking only a no-fault divorce decree (See Addendum 
A, pp. 4-6; Addendum F). The court in which the no-fault action was filed granted a decree 
of divorce to the parties on November 25, 2010. Rec. 8-10, Addendum F; Rec. 86, 90. The 
decree did not adjudicate any other issues attendant to a divorce including rights with regard 
4 
to the custody of the children and did not reserve any right to do so. Rec. 8-10, 86, 90, 
Addendum F. 
When the judge in the original divorce/custody action in Mexico was advised of the 
filing of the separate no-fault action that had circumvented the jurisdiction of the court in the 
original divorce/custody action, that judge entered an order on February 8, 2013, dismissing 
the original divorce/custody action in its entirety and rescinding and nullifying all prior 
orders relating to custody and visitation. Rec. 1-7, 11-16, Addendum E. 
Mother, after she had been awarded sole custody in Mexico and believing that all 
restrictions against her leaving Mexico had been lifted, left Mexico and traveled with the 
children to Utah County, Utah in December 2010, where they have resided to this day. Rec. 
1-6, 272-299, Addendum F (pp. 4-5 thereof). Mother left Mexico with the children, traveled 
to Utah and changed her name in response to emotional and physical abuse at the hands of 
Father. Rec. 54, 458-470, 481-190. 
After the February 8, 2013 order dismissing the original divorce/custody case in 
Mexico, there were no other proceedings pending in Mexico. Accordingly Mother alleged 
in her petition that at the time of the filing of her petition in Utah (11/8/2013), there were no 
custody proceedings pending in any other court in the U.S. or Mexico and that Utah had been 
the home state of the children since December, 20 I 0. Rec. 1-6. Accordingly Mother 
contended that Utah had jurisdiction to adjudicate the petition under the UUCCJEA. Rec. 
1-6, 272-299, 381-85, 386-409. 
5 
On June 12, 2014, Father filed a motion to dismiss the petition alleging that "there are 
existing custody determinations in Mexico and ongoing proceedings there." Rec. 81, 86, 98. 
Yet Father acknowledged in his supporting memorandum: 
Rec. 86, 99. 
The last custody determination entered by the Mexican family court on 
February 8, 2013, revoked each and every one of the prior orders that gave 
Mother any superior custody right to that of Father. ... 
On July 17, 2014, Mother filed a comprehensive memorandum in opposition to 
Father's motion to dismiss demonstrating, by the production of the actual orders from the 
courts in Mexico, that both actions in Mexico had been concluded or dismissed and that there 
were no active cases or enforceable custody orders issued therefrom. Rec. 272-332. 
On October 15, 2014, Father filed a reply brief in support of his motion to dismiss 
essentially abandoning the allegation that either the original divorce/custody case or the no-
fault proceeding were still pending or had produced any enforceable order relating to the 
custody of the children. Rec. 341-42. Father emphasized instead the theory that a criminal 
proceeding against Mother for allegedly abducting the children constituted a "child custody 
proceeding" under the UUCCJ EA. Rec. 341, 343-44. 
On October 20, 2014, Commissioner Thomas Patton heard oral arguments and 
recommended that the petition be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The commissioner, 
without specific findings or citations to particular orders or documents, found that there was 
an active proceeding in Mexico related to custody of the children and that the Mother had 
6 
\t,. 
engaged in unjustifiable misconduct. Rec. 377. An order embodying the recommendation 
was entered on December 5, 2014. Rec. 853. 
Mother filed an objection to the commissioner's recommendation with supporting 
memorandum and filed a request for oral argument and hearing on November 3, 2014. Rec. 
381-85, 386-492, 493-94. 
On March 2, 2015, Mother filed a motion for the court to take judicial notice of the 
filing of an entirely new action by Father in Mexico in February 2014 ( after the petition in 
this case had been filed (11/18/2013)) seeking a custody determination and supportive orders. 
Rec. 895-897, 898-913. The new filing by Father in Mexico clearly demonstrated that 
neither of the two previously filed actions in Mexico were active or could be used to facilitate 
adjudication of the custody of the parties' minor children. Id. 
On March 5, 2015, Judge Christine Johnson conducted oral arguments on Mother's 
objection and upheld the Commissioner's recommendation. Rec. 916. An order reflecting 
the ruling was entered on March 17, 2015. Rec. 931. 
Mother filed a motion under Rules 52 and 59 to amend the order on March 31, 2015. 
Rec. 937-943, 944-1110. Father filed a response on April 14, 2015. Rec. 1147. On April 30, 
2015, the court entered its ruling and order denying the Mother's motion. Rec. 1238. 
Mother filed a notice of appeal on May 21, 2015. Rec. 1241. 
7 
B. Statement of Facts 
I. Facts Alleged in Verified Petition of the Mother. 
Mother filed a verified petition alleging the facts required to invoke the court's 
jurisdiction under the UUCCJEA. 
1. In her petition filed on November 18, 2013, Mother alleged that she and the 
parties two children had been residents of Utah County, State of Utah since December 2010 
(nearly three years). Rec. 1-7. 
2. The Mother and minor children are dual citizens of the United States and 
Mexico. Father is a citizen of Mexico. Id. 
3. Mother and Father were married in Mexico on June 26, 1999 and had two 
children born as issue of the marriage, to wit: S.M.L., born May 2001; and, R.M.L, born 
November 2003. During the course of the marriage Mother was the primary caretaker of the 
children. Id. 
4. There were two actions filed in Mexico that related to the marriage of the 
parties. The first or main action involved proceedings related to the divorce and the custody 
of the minor children. There were numerous hearings and orders issued by the court in that 
original divorce/custody action. Rec. 1-6, 272-332, Addendum A (pp. 4-6) and E. 1 The most 
significant order was dated June 30, 2010. It represented a final custody order, granting 
1 A detailed summary of the facts relating to the original divorce/custody case in 
Mexico is set out below as part of the narrative relating to the Hague Convention proceeding 
initiated by Father. 
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Mother "custodia definitiva" or sole custody subject to Father's limited supervised visitation 
rights. Rec. 272-332, Addendum A (pp. 4 -6). Father appealed the June 30,2010 order. Id. 
5. While that original divorce/custody action was proceeding, the law changed 
in Mexico and allowed the filing of a no-fault divorce. Because Father had been unable to 
establish grounds for divorce in the original divorce/custody case, he filed a separate divorce 
action in Mexico in another court invoking the no-fault law. That court granted the parties 
a divorce on November 25, 2010. Rec. 1-7, 8-10, Addendum A.2 
6. When it became apparent that Father had circumvented the authority of the 
original divorce/custody case by seeking a no-fault decree in another court, the judge in the 
original divorce/ custody case entered an order on February 8, 2013, dismissing the action and 
specifically rescinding all prior orders issued in the case relating to the divorce, custody and 
visitation. Rec. 1-7, 12-16, 272-332, 381-409, Addendum E. 
7. Because Father had and continued to be physically, mentally and verbally 
abusive to Mother and the children, Mother left Mexico with the children and moved to 
Orem, Utah in December 2010 and they have resided in Utah since that time. Rec. 1-7, 54, 
272-299, 458-70, 481-90. At the time Mother left Mexico she believed that all restrictions 
on her leaving Mexico had been lifted and that there was no legal prohibition from her 
leaving. Id., Addendum A (p. 5). 
2The Decree of Divorce recited that it was final and conclusive for all legal purposes 
and made no order relating to the custody of the children and did not provide any mechanism 
for such issues to be brought before that court in the future. Id. 
9 
8. Mother acknowledges that Father caused a criminal proceeding to be 
commenced in Mexico based upon her leaving the country with the children that resulted in ~ 
extradition proceedings c01mnenced in the United States. Rec. 1, 4, 272-299, 443-45. Mother 
is actively defending those accusations in Mexico and is in full compliance with the orders 
of the court handling the criminal allegations. Id. Importantly, Mother is not charged with 
taking the children out of Mexico in violation of a court order or court restriction emanating 
from the divorce action. Rather, she is charged with leaving Mexico with the children in 
violation of Father's general or common law custodial rights. Rec. 86, 139-148. 
9. Father filed a Petition for Immediate Return of Children to pursuant to the 
Hague Convention and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act in the United States 
District Court for the District of Utah, Central Division, Case No. 2: 13CV422 DAK. Rec. 
18-52, Addendum A. The petition was assigned to United States District Judge Dale A. 
Kimball. After extensive briefing and factual proceedings including interviews with the 
children, Judge Kimball entered extensive findings of fact and denied Father's petition by 
order dated August 5, 2013. Rec. 18-52, Addendum A. 
II. Facts Alleged in Father's Motion to Dismiss. 
I 0. Aside from including Judge Kimball's findings from the Hague Convention 
proceedings, Father does not dispute the material allegations made by Mother in her petition. 
Rec. 81, 86 (iii! 1-4, 6, 14, 21, 23-24). 
11. Father acknowledges that the original divorce/custody action in Mexico was 
filed in October 2007. Rec. 86, ii 6. Father further acknowledges that while the original 
10 
divorce/custody was on appeal from the June 30, 2010 order granting Mother sole custody 
of the parties minor children, he filed a no-fault proceeding in another court seeking a decree 
of divorce. Id., atilil 11-13. 
12. Father claims however, that the Court in the no-fault case, when it entered the 
decree of divorce, reserved the right for further litigation of child custody. Id. Father cannot 
identify any language in the November 25, 2010 no-fault divorce decree reserving those 
issues or contemplating any further hearings Id. See also, Rec. 1, Addendum A. 
13. Father does not allege that in the five years since the no-fault decree has been 
entered in Mexico, he has been able to reopen the proceedings in the no-fault case or the 
original divorce/custody action to seek further orders of the court regarding custody or 
enforcement of any of the prior orders that were rescinded and recalled. Rec. 81, 86. 
14. As it relates to the original divorce/custody action filed in Mexico, Father does 
not contest Mother's allegation that the court, on February 8, 2013, upon hearing about the 
no-fault action, dismissed the entire case and rescinded all orders previously entered by that 
court. Rec. 86, ~ 21, 110. 
15. Further Father impliedly concedes that both the no-fault proceeding and the 
original divorce/custody case were concluded without continuing orders regarding custody 
and that they cannot be reopened, in disclosing that he had to file a new action in Mexico on 
1 I 
March 27, 2014 (after Mother's petition had been filed on l 1/18/2013) to try and obtain a 
custody order in Mexico. Rec. 86, ii 29, 895, 898. 3 
16. Father has not produced any order under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act 
(UF JA), Utah Code§§ 78B-5-301 to 788-5-307(2012), demonstrating any on-going custody 
proceeding in Mexico that predated the filing of the petition in this case. 
III. Facts Identified in the Hague Convention Proceedings. 
Facts found by Judge Kimball in the Hague Convention4 case that relate to the subject 
matter of this action can be summarized as follows: Rec. 1, 17, 86, 110, 125, 139, Addendum 
A. 
17. Father instituted an action under the Hague Convention on June 7, 2013, to 
obtain an order returning the parties' minor children to him. Addendum A ( p.1 ). The court's 
role, in that proceeding, was not to make a traditional custody detennination but "to 
detennine in what jurisdiction the children should be physically located so that the proper 
jurisdiction can make those custody decisions." Id. at p. 2. 
3The filing of the new action in Mexico on March 27, 2014, was four months after the 
petition was filed in this case by Mother and establishes that at the time the petition was filed 
in this case, there were no custody proceedings pending or orders in place in Mexico. 
4The Hague Convention has been implemented in the United States by the 
International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U .S.C. §§ 11601-11610. The Hague 
Convention was adopted to protect children from the adverse effects of being wrongfully 
removed to or retained in a foreign country and to establish procedures for their return. See 
Matas-Vidal v. Lihhey-Aguilera, No. 2: 13-cv-422 OAK, 2013 Dist. Lexis 110630, 2013 WL 
3995300 (D. Utah Aug. 5, 2013). 
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18. There appears to have been significant discord in the man-iage of the parties 
for many years. Id. at p. 4. Father filed for divorce in early October 2007 in Mexico City.5 
An order was entered ban-ing the removal of the children from Mexico on October 16, 2007. 
On December 14, 2007, Mother was granted physical custody of the children and Father was 
only given three hours a day of supervised visitation on alternate Saturdays and Sundays. Id. 
19. On June 30, 2010, the court issued an order granting "custodia definitiva" or 
sole custody to Mother. The parties disputed whether the award was one of sole custody and 
whether the order dissolved any ban on leaving the country. Id. at p. 5. In August 2010, 
Father appealed the June 30, 2010 order. Id. 
20. While the order of June 30,2010 issued in the Thirty-Six Court was on appeal 
as described above, Father filed a separate action in the Superior Court of Justice for the 
Federal District, Domestic Affairs, Twenty-Fourth court, File No. 1529/2010. This action 
sought a no-fault divorce and was filed prior to September 20, 2010.6 Id., See also, Rec. 1, 
17. 
21. On November 25, 2010, the court hearing the no-fault divorce, granted the 
parties a divorce. As it relates to the other issues in the divorce, the court's order states: 
5The action for divorce was filed by Father in Mexico City, in the Superior Court for 
the Federal District, Domestic Affairs, Thirty-Six Court, File No. 1472/2007. 
6When the original divorce was filed by Father in Mexico, the law required him to 
allege and prove grounds for divorce. Father from 2007 to 20 IO was unable to establish 
grounds for the granting of a divorce from Mother. Prior to the filing of the second action 
by Father, the law in Mexico changed and allowed for a no-fault divorce. Father filed the 
second action presumably to take advantage of the change in the law. 
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"with respect to the proposal and counterproposal of a settlement agreement submitted by the 
parties, their rights are left in tact so that, if any, they may exercise their rights by filing an 
ancillary proceeding." Addendum A and F. The court did not enter any order relating to the 
minor children of the parties and did not leave the case open for subsequent action with 
regard to custody. Id. 
22. No part of the November 25,2010 no-fault decree dealt with or rendered orders 
relating to child custody or visitation. The no-fault decree was the final order in that case. 
Id. 
23. In December 2010, Mother and the children left Mexico and went directly to 
Orem, Utah where the children were enrolled in school on December 21, 2010. Rec. 1-7, 
45 8-4 70, 481-49, Addendum A. Mother believed that all prohibitions against her leaving 
Mexico with the children had been withdrawn. Id. 
24. On February 8, 2013, the judge in the original divorce/custody case, 
1472/2007, issued an order dismissing that action, citing the conduct of the Father in filing 
the ancillary no-fault divorce action. The judge in the 2007 filing set aside all prior orders 
in the original divorce/custody case and dismissed the original divorce/custody case in its 
entirety. Rec. 1-7, Addendum E. After the date of that order, there was no pending actions 
for divorce and no orders relating to custody of the children, alimony, property settlement or 
any other related issues in Mexico. Additionally, there were no orders of the two courts in 
Mexico restricting Mother's right to take the children out of Mexico. Rec. 1-7. 
25. In addition to the findings detailed above, the Judge Kimball court found: 
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A. The Petitioner upon arriving in Utah in December 2010, enrolled the 
children in school on December 21,2010 and that the children had been 
enrolled in the same school since that time. Id., p. 5. 
B. 
C. 
Teachers and administrators at the children's school had repeatedly 
noted their good behavior and academic excellence. The children are 
both on a competitive swim team. SM-L was a cub scout and now 
participates regularly as a boy scout. He is also on a soccer team. RM-
L is a cub scout. Both were baptized as members of the LDS faith. Id. 
Petitioner began working for the Provo School District on March 7, 
2011 and she has remained gainfully employed with the district since 
that time. 
Addendum A 
26. Two psychological reports were prepared in Mexico, one in 2008 and one in 
20 I 0, but not filed until 2011. Id. , at pp. 5-6. The reports are at variance with one another, 
even though they were prepared by the same person. The first report recommends that 
Mother should have custody. The second report makes no recommendation as to custody. 
Id. Mother had already left Mexico by the time the second report was submitted to the court. 
Id. 
27. Judge Kimball found that the Father's "patria potestas" or common law 
"parental authority" under general Mexican law are rights of custody under the Hague 
Convention and that the removal of the children in December 2010 from Mexico violated 
those rights of Father. Id. at pp. 7-8. 
28. Judge Kimball made no findings as to whether any order of a court in Mexico 
was in place when the petition in this case was file or whether there was any pending action 
in Mexico where the custody issue was before a tribunal. Id 
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29. In refusing to order the children of the parties to return to Mexico, Judge 
Kimball relied upon the "well-settled" exception, Article 12 of the Hague Convention. Id., 
pp. 10-11 ). In applying this exception, Judge Kimball stated: 
Id. 
In the instant case, SM-L and RM-L have been in Utah since late December, 
2010-for over two and one-half years. The court finds that they are both very 
well settled. And given the boys' ages, 12 and 9 ½, respectively, these thirty-
plus months have been meaningful to the boys. They have been consistently 
enrolled in school since January 2011. They have missed very few days during 
those two school years, and their academic success has been remarkable. Both 
boys have many friends, caring neighbors, and fellow LDS church members 
with whom they have formed close bonds. Their maternal grandmother also 
frequently cares for them. The children are active in their church, in boy scouts 
(or cub scouts for RM-L), and they are on a competitive swim team.SM-Lis 
also on a soccer team. Many friends and neighbors have provided glowing 
letters about Respondent and the boys, and attesting to the boys' happiness and 
stable environment. Their mother has also been consistently employed since 
March 2011 and appears to be financially stable. They boys both speak fluent 
English and appear to have adjusted well to their living situation. Given the 
outpouring of support for the boys and Respondent, both in terms of having 
friends and neighbors attend the two court hearings and in submitting letters 
to the court, the court has no question that these two boys are surrounded by 
a loving and supportive community and that the boys are thriving in their 
current environment. They are indeed settled in their new environment. ... 
FN 61: For example, their school principal has written a glowing review of 
both boys, stating, among other things, that "they both are among the very best 
behaved and well-mannered students I have known in school during my 13 
years as a teacher and 15 years as a public school administrator. They have 
excellent attendance, including never being tardy to school the entire past year, 
and they have never required any attendant or behavior interventions from the 
school or their teachers." In addition, he stated that both "regularly are 
recognized and receive awards in our quarterly recognition celebrations for 
going "above and beyond" in numerous ways, and in every way they are 
exemplary students and citizens." He also notes that "they are thriving and 
happy in school, and they are well on their way to being happy, productive, 
and successful citizens. I have absolutely no concerns about them or their well-
b . " emg ..... 
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30. Judge Kimball also relied on Article 13 of the Convention which provides that 
a court may also refuse to order the return of the children if it finds that the children object 
to being returned and have attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate 
to take account of their views. The children are now more than two years older and do not 
want to return to Mexico. The court made extensive findings on this issue: 
In this case, SM-Lis twelve-years old and will start seventh grade next month. 
RM-L will be ten-years old in three months and will soon start fourth grade. 
The court had the opportunity to observe the demeanor and maturity of both 
children during the court's in camera interview of each of them. Undoubtedly 
the task of meeting alone with a federal judge and his staff, with no parents or 
attorneys present, was a daunting one, but both boys faced the situation 
courageously. They both demonstrated a high level of maturity in answering 
the court's questions-answering the questions in an articulate, thoughtful, and 
respectful manner. They are both good students with strong academic records. 
They both expressed a strong desire to remain in Utah and had particular 
objections to returning to Mexico. They confirmed that they enjoy going to 
school here, they are involved in church and several sports activities, and they 
have many friends here. Indeed, both boys became visibly distraught when the 
court discussed the court's task of evaluating whether they should be returned 
to Mexico. The response of both boys appeared to be purely genuine-not 
concocted or rehearsed in any way. Additionally, the boys were adamant about 
not wanting to have a supervised visit their father while he was in town for the 
instant court proceeding. 
Accordingly, the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the boys 
are of an appropriate age and maturity such that it is appropriate for the court 
to take into account their desire to not return to Mexico .... 
Here, the court recognizes that the boys have spent the past two years solely 
with their mother and maternal grandmother, and that this circumstance has 
undoubtedly had an impact on their desire to stay with their mother in Utah. 
It is also possible that their mother has negatively colored the boys' view of 
their father. Here, while the children's objections to returning to Mexico could 
be due to the mother's possible undue influence over them, the court finds that 
this possible undue influence is not the only reason the children desire not to 
return to Mexico, and thus, the court declines to ignore their wishes. The 
children appear to be genuinely happy and thriving in their current situation. 
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The court has attempted to balance this possible undue influence against other 
reasons the boys desire to stay here and concludes that even though the mother 
has perhaps exerted some undue influence on the boys, the court should still 
take into account the children's wishes to remain in Utah and not be returned 
to Mexico. For this independent reason, the comt declines to return them to Mexico. 
Id., pp. 14-15. 
Id. 
31. Importantly, Judge Kimball concluded: 
The court, however, is convinced that the return of these children to 
Mexico City at this time and under these circumstances-however wrongfully 
the circumstances have arisen-would severely traumatize these children. The 
court emphasizes that this decision has a limited purpose and effect. It does not 
mean that Petitioner cannot exercise his visitation rights with his children. It 
merely establishes that the boys will not be returned to Mexico but will remain 
in Utah for any custody proceedings that are initiated here. In light of the 
pending Extradition proceedings against Respondent, however, the future 
remains uncertain for this family. (Emphasis added) 
31. Father appealed the decision of Judge Kimball but the appeal was dismissed. 
IV. Findings of the Lower Court. 
32. The court's findings in the Order of Dismissal dated 12/5/2014 (Addendum B), 
that are relevant to this appeal include: 
9. The Court finds that Mexico had jurisdiction in October 2007 when 
child custody proceedings were initiated in the 36th Court of Family 
Matters in the Federal District of Mexico in case number 1427/2007 
and that the subsequent bifurcation in the 24th Court of Family Matters 
in the Federal District of Mexico in case number 1529/20 IO further 
confinned that jurisdiction and reserved the patties custodial rights as 
subject to further litigation therein in November 20 I 0. 
I 0. Mexico reserved the right to enter additional order regarding the 
custody of these children, and no Mexico court has vacated that order 
or otherwise unreserved the right to conclude custody proceedings 
there ... 
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12. Mexico had child custody jurisdiction. It had jurisdiction over both 
parties, it had home-state jurisdiction over the children, and it had 
jurisdiction of the child custody action pending before it. Such 
jurisdiction is continuing and exclusive in nature. Mexico never gave 
up or abandoned it [sic] jurisdiction over its prior orders or the various 
proceedings that remain pending there. 
16. If Mother desires to modify the parties existing custodial rights, as 
articulated in the orders from Mexico, she must seek such modification 
in the courts in Mexico ... Father continues to reside in Mexico, and the 
courts there retain continuing jurisdiction over modification of their 
orders ... 
18. Additionally, criminal charges of Child Trafficking have been pending 
against Mother .... Mother fails to acknowledge that the criminal case 
... is a further exercise and manifestation of Mexico's continuing 
exclusive jurisdiction to conduct custody proceedings under the 
UCCJEA, and therefore this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain 
simultaneous proceedings until such criminal charges are resolved, 
pursuant to Utah Code 78-13-206. 
19. If convicted of the pending criminal charges in Mexico, Mother's 
parental rights will be terminated . . . Consequently, Utah lacks the 
authority to conduct simultaneous child custody proceedings until-at 
the very least-Mother's Child Trafficking criminal charges are 
resolved. 
20. Alternatively, even if this Court had a basis to exercise jurisdiction it 
declines to do so as a result of Mother's unjustifiable conduct. .. It is 
uncontested that Mother fled the territorial jurisdiction ofMexico when 
proceedings and orders were still pending there, and that she has 
refused to return or otherwise engage in the judicial process there. This 
Court will not condone or otherwise overlook Mother's apparent 
attempts to evade and her unwillingness to engage in the judicial 
process in Mexico. Even if there were some arguable basis for 
jurisdiction herein, the Cow1 will neither exercise emergency nor 
general child custody jurisdiction over these children because Mother 
has made every effort to avoid the jurisdiction of the courts in Mexico, 
and frustrated the ability of the courts in Mexico to conclude the 
custody proceedings there. In essence, Mother has engaged in 
unjustifiable conduct, and she asks this Cow1 to exercise jurisdiction 
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Addendum B. 
over issues she has refused to address, but that she could have pursued 
and concluded in Mexico months ago. (Emphasis added) 
33. The court's findings in the Order Overruling Petitioner's Objection dated 
3/17/2015 (Addendum C), that are relevant to this appeal include: 
Addendum C. 
3. There are both civil and criminal proceedings in Mexico wherein the 
custody of the parties' minor children and the parties' parental rights remain 
at issue. This indicates to the Court that Mexico has not abandoned or 
otherwise continues to exercise jurisdiction over issues of child custody. 
Consequently, this Court is without and otherwise declines to assert child 
custody jurisdiction ..... (Emphasis added). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The parties were married on June 26, 1999, Two boys were born as issue of the 
marriage (ages 14 and 12). Two actions were commenced in Mexico by Father seeking the 
entry of a decree of divorce and related orders. The original divorce/custody case, 
commenced in October 2007, resulted in a number of orders relating to the parties and 
custody of the children. That action however was dismissed by the court in Mexico by order 
dated February 8, 2013. In that same order, all previous orders relating to the custody of the 
children were rescinded and nullified. There were no enforceable orders or pending 
proceedings after the entry of that order. The second action in Mexico, seeking a no-fault 
decree of divorce, tenninated with the entry of a divorce decree on November 25,2010. That 
decree explicitly did not make any orders relating to custody or visitation with the children. 
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Mother left Mexico with the children in December 20 IO after she had obtained an 
order of custody in the original divorce/custody case in Mexico to escape the physical and 
psychological abuse inflicted on her and the children by Father. When Mother filed her 
petition in Utah on November 18, 2013, Utah had been the residence of the children for 
nearly three years and there were no proceedings in Mexico or enforceable orders from any 
prior proceedings. Under the clear provisions of the UUCCJEA, Utah had jurisdiction to 
hear Mother's petition and the court committed error in finding that Utah did not have 
jurisdiction. Further, the court committed error in finding that at the time the petition was 
filed there were proceedings regarding custody of the children pending in Mexico and/or that 
there were any enforceable orders from courts in Mexico relating to the children's custody. 
The court, without following the requirements of the UUCCJEA to contact the courts 
in Mexico and conduct its own investigation, made inadequate and unsubstantiated factual 
findings concluding that there were pending proceedings in Mexico and/or enforceable 
orders therefrom. 
The court misinterpreted the "simultaneous action" provision of the UUCCJEA and 
held that a criminal prosecution in Mexico against Mother constituted a simultaneous action 
establishing Mexico's jurisdiction. 
Additionally, the court improperly concluded that Mother, who left Mexico and 
changed her name to escape abuse in 20 I 0, was guilty of unjustifiable conduct in 2013, that 
allowed Utah courts to defer exercising jurisdiction. 
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Utah has jurisdiction to hear Mother's petition and enter orders relating to the custody 
and support of the minor children. No other state or country has jurisdiction under the 
UUCCJEA to hear matter related to the custody of the parties children. 
ARGUMENT 
I: THE RULING THAT UTAH COURTS DO NOT HAVE 
JURISDICTION UNDER THE UUCCJEA TO ADJUDICATE 
MOTHER'S PETITION IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
A. The Required Predicate Facts to Establish Jurisdiction under the 
UUCCJEA are Undisputed in this Case. 
The lower court, in each of its three relevant orders, concluded that Utah does not 
have subject matter jurisdiction to hear Mother's petition but failed to identify any legal or 
factual inadequacies in Mother's petition to support that conclusion (Addendum B, Order of 
Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction, 12/5/14; Addendum C, Order Overruling Petitioner's 
Objection to Commissioner's Recmmnendation, 3/17/15; Addendum D, Ruling and Order 
on Petitioner's Motion to Amend Order, 4/30/15). 
The relevant undisputed facts established by the verified petition and Father's verified 
memorandum in support of motion to dismiss make out the statutory requirements for 
jurisdiction under the UUCCJEA. Specifically, that one of the parties and the children 
resided in Utah County, Utah for more than six months prior to the filing of the petition and 
that Utah was thus the "home state" of the children and that no other state or nation could 
make a similar claim. 
Both the petition and Father's motion to dismiss established that Father and Mother 
were married in Mexico on June 26, 1999 and had two children born as issue of that 
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marriage, to wit: S.M.L., born May 2001; and, R.M.L., born November 2003. The parties 
were divorced by a decree entered in Mexico on November 25,2010. Mother and the minor 
children have resided in Utah County, State of Utah continually from December 2010 to the 
present and Utah was unquestionably the home state of the minor children on November 18, 
2013, the date Mother's petition was filed with the court. Statement of Facts, supra, iii! 1-7 
and 10. 
The lower court conducted no evidentiary hearings and failed to make any findings 
of fact that contravened the factual allegations made in Mother's verified petition and 
Father's verified response. Generally, in adjudicating a motion to dismiss, the reviewing 
court accepts the factual allegations in the petition as true and considers all reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from those facts in a light most favorable to the petitioner. Educators 
Mut. Ins. Ass 'n v. Allied Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 890 P .2d 1029, 1029-30 (Utah 1995) 
(quoting Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764, 766 (Utah 1991 )); see also Lowe v. Sorenson 
Research Co., 779 P.2d 668, 669 (Utah 1989). 
Accordingly, based upon the clear provisions of the UUCCJEA, Utah was 
undisputably the home state of the children when the petition was filed and Mexico could not 
establish jurisdiction based upon "home state" criteria. Utah Code § 78B-13-201 (2008 as 
Amended). 
B. The Provisions of the UUCCJEA and Interpreting Case law Establish 
Utah's Jurisdiction Under the Facts of this Case. 
The case law establishes that both jurisdictional questions and questions of statutory 
interpretation are questions oflaw that the Court reviews for correctness. In re P.F.B., 2008 
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UT App 271, ,I 10, 191 P.3d 49. Under the jurisdictional sections of the UCCJEA, when 
determining whether a state court has subject matter jurisdiction to make an initial child 
custody determination, priority is given to the child's home state. See Utah Code § 
788-13-201 (I). A child's home state is defined as, 
... the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent 
for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of 
a child custody proceeding. In the case of a child less than six months of age, 
the tenn means the state in which the child lived from birth with any of the 
persons mentioned. 
Utah Code § 788-13-102(7). See also Meyeres v. Meyeres, 2008 UT App 364, 196 P.3d 
604. 
The statute is clear that the court of the state that "is the home state of the child on the 
date of the commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child within six 
months before the commencement" has subject matter jurisdiction over the child custody 
proceeding. Utah Code§ 788-13-201 (I )(a). 
So long as there is a court that meets these home-state requirements and that court 
does not decline subject matter jurisdiction based on inconvenient forum, see generally Utah 
Code § 788-13-207, or unjustifiable conduct, see genera/(y Utah Code § 788-13-208, no 
other state's court will have subject matter jurisdiction to make an initial custody 
determination. See Utah Code§ 788-13-201 ( 1 )(b )-( d); see also A1jo11a v. Torres, 941 So. 2d 
451,455 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); In re BroH'l1, 203 S.W.3d 888, 891 (Tex. App. 2006) 
("[H]ome-state jurisdiction trumps all other possible bases of jurisdiction in an initial child 
custody action .... "); Hatch v. Hatch (In re Kalhe.s), 2007 WI App 136, ~I 12, 302 Wis. 2d 
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215, 733 N.W.2d 648 ("Under the Uniform Act, home state jurisdiction always receives 
priority, and other jurisdictional bases are available only when there is no home state, or 
where the home state declines jurisdiction."). 
The undisputed facts in this case establish the jurisdictional requirements of the 
statute-specifically that the minor children lived with Mother in Utah County, Utah for more 
than six months prior to the filing of the petition. The statute is clear: "[a] court of this state 
has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination only if: (a) this state is the 
home state on the date of the commencement of the proceeding .... " Utah Code § 
788-13-20 I ( I )(a). Further, although Father's briefing suggested that Mexico had some kind 
of continuing jurisdiction, Father failed to produce a single document wherein the courts of 
Mexico conducted proceedings after the February 8, 2013 order dismissing the original 
divorce/custody case in Mexico, or produce an order evidencing Mexico's continuing 
jurisdiction over the custody of the parties' children. 
The trial court failed to review and adjudicate the issue of subject matter jurisdiction 
in accordance with the statute and interpreting case law and committed clear error in holding 
that Utah did not have jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. The com1s made no findings as to 
home state and further made no findings as to what facts established that Mexico had issued 
a valid and enforceable original order regarding custody and/or was exercising some kind of 
continuing jurisdiction under the UUCCJ EA. 
Accordingly, the orders of the lower court on jurisdiction should be reversed. 
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II: THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT, AT THE TIME 
THE PETITION WAS FILED, THERE WERE SIMULTANEOUS 
CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS IN MEXICO. 
The court committed error in concluding that at the time Mother's petition was filed 
(11/18/2013), there were simultaneously occurring custody proceedings in Mexico, thus 
prohibiting Utah from exercising jurisdiction in the matter. Utah Code§ 788-13-206 (2008 
as amended). See, Addendum 8, C and D. 
A. The Evidence That There were no Simultaneous Custody Proceedings 
in Mexico at the Time Mother's Petition was Filed is Clear and 
Convincing. 
As established above, there is no evidence that, at the time of the filing of the petition 
in this case, there was an existing original order regarding the children in Mexico or that 
there were pending court proceedings in Mexico related to custody. 
The UCCJEA imposes on the parties the duty of providing in their first pleading or, 
in an attached affidavit, under oath, a statement as to whether the party has participated, as 
a party or witness, in other proceedings concerning the custody of the children and if so, the 
party is required to provide the identity of the court, the case number of the proceeding and 
the date of the identified child custody proceeding.7 Utah Code§ 788-13-209 (1) - (4) 
(2008). The court has the power to stay an action until the relevant information relating to 
ancillary proceedings is provided. Id. lmp011antly, if a party responds in the affirmative to 
7
"Child custody proceeding" means a proceeding in which legal custody, physical 
custody, or parent-time with respect to a child is an issue. The term includes a proceeding for 
divorce, separation, neglect, abuse, dependency, guardianship, paternity, termination of 
parental rights, and protection from domestic violence, in which the issue may appear." Utah 
Code§ 788-13-102(4) (2008). 
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having infonnation relating to another custody proceeding, the party is obligated to provide 
the court, under oath, any and all details pertinent to the court's jurisdiction. Id. Finally, each 
party has a continuing duty to inform the court of any proceeding in or out of the state that 
could affect the present proceeding. Id. 
The evidence provided to the court, through the disclosures of the parties, 1s 
summarized as follows. 
1. Main Mexico Divorce/Custody Action. 
Father filed for divorce against Mother in Mexico City in early October 2007. The 
action was filed in the Superior Court for the Federal District, Domestic Affairs, Thirty-Six 
Court, File No. 1472/2007. That case produced multiple orders relating to the custody of the 
children including the orders of 10/17/2007, 12/11/2007, 6/30/2010. Statement of Facts, 
supra, iii! 4-6, 10-16, Addendum A, pp. 4-6. 
In the June 30, 2010 order, the court in Mexico entered a final custody order granting 
Mother sole custody or "custodia definitiva." Id. See also, Rec. 86, 88-89. Mother further 
contended that the same order dissolved any restrictions on her travel outside Mexico. 
Addendum Exhibit A, p. 5. 
In August 20 I 0, both Mother and Father appealed the June 30, 2010 order entered in 
the divorce action. While the original divorce/custody case was on appeal, Father filed the 
no-fault divorce case summarized below. Because the original divorce/custody case had 
adjudicated or was in the process of resolving all the other issues attendant to a divorce, 
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Father sought only a decree of divorce in the no-fault proceedings. A decree of divorce was 
entered in that no-fault separate action on November 25, 20 I 0. Rec. 1-7, Addendum F. 
On January 7, 2011, the Mexican appeals court reversed the June 30, 2010 order. 
Addendum A. When the judge in the original divorce/custody action learned that Father had 
filed a separate action for divorce under the newly adopted no-fault law, he entered the order 
of February 8, 2013. Addendum A, E. In that order, the court rescinded and nullified all the 
previously entered custody orders in the case and dismissed, with finality, the divorce action. 
Addendum E. Accordingly, after February 8, 2013, there were no existing court orders 
regarding custody and visitation in Mexico and there was no underlying actions relating to 
custody or visitation. Certainly at the time the petition was filed in this case, November 18, 
2013, no action relating to custody existed in Mexico and all prior orders from the dismissed 
original divorce/custody case had been rescinded. 
Although Father made references to the original divorce/custody action as somehow 
being a "simultaneous proceeding" under the UUCCJEA, no party has represented or 
contended that the original divorce/custody action was not dismissed. No party has asserted 
that there is any procedure to revive the divorce action or that the rescinded orders could be 
renewed and reissued. The best evidence relating to the dismissal of the original 
divorce/custody case in Mexico and the withdrawal of the prior orders is that Father has been 
unable to initiate any action in that case or initiate any proceeding to enforce any prior order 
since its dismissal on February 8, 2013. As discussed below, Father had to resort to filing 
a new action in Mexico after the petition in this case was filed. Father would not have filed 
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a new action if the prior divorce action could be revived and prior orders reissued. Further 
confinnation is found in the fact that Father failed to even attempt to file in Utah any order 
issued in the original divorce/custody case in Mexico under the Foreign Judgment Registry 
Act, Utah Code § 78B-13-305( I )(b ). 
2. No Fault Proceeding in Mexico. 
As discussed above, while the original divorce/custody case in Mexico was on appeal, 
Father, trying to take advantage of newly enacted no-fault provisions, filed a separate action 
for divorce in another court in Mexico and sought to obtain only a decree of divorce. On 
November 25, 20 I 0, the court signed a decree of divorce under the no-fault law and 
explicitly refused to deal with other issues in the divorce including custody of the children. 
Statement of Facts, supra, iii! 4-6, 10-16; Addendum A, pp. 4-6; Addendum F; Rec. 1-7. 
This action was filed only to get a no-fault divorce. No other issues relating to the 
divorce, including custody, were included because both parties knew that all such issues were 
litigated and, in fact, on appeal in the original divorce/custody case. Father did not assert or 
demonstrate that he can legally open the no-fault case or expand the issues originally 
addressed therein. Instead, Father instituted a new action in Mexico after the petition in this 
case was filed. 
3. Newly Filed Case in Mexico 
There can be no serious question that the original divorce/custody case in Mexico was 
dismissed and all orders entered therein rescinded and nullified by the February 8, 2013 
order. Fm1her, the plain language of the no-fault decree establishes that it is a final order that 
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attempted only to dissolve the marriage of the parties and did not attempt to resolve the other 
issues, including custody, pending in the original divorce/custody case. There is no evidence 
or legal citations that either the original divorce/custody case or the no-fault case could be 
revived to provide a forum to litigate custody in Mexico and somehow construed to maintain 
the original date of filing. 
Mother therefore submits that there is simply no credible evidence of any kind that 
there was an existing proceeding or order relating to the custody of the parties' minor 
children on November 18, 2013, when the petition in this case was filed. 
Father implicitly acknowledged the absence of any existing custody proceeding or 
enforceable order in Mexico at the time the petition was filed, when he filed a new action in 
Mexico on March 27, 2014 (128 days after the filing of the petition). Statement of Facts, 
supra, ii 15. Father would not have filed a new action post-petition if he could have 
resurrected either the original divorce or the no-fault ancillary proceeding. 
B. The Lower Court Failed to Undertake the Investigation and Fact 
Finding Required by Statute as to the Existence of Simultaneous 
Proceedings in Another Jurisdiction. 
The UUCCJEA provides the procedure to be used by the court in determining if, at 
the time an action is filed, there was a simultaneous custody proceeding in another 
jurisdiction, and, if so, how to resolve the matter. Utah Code§ 788-13-206( I) provides that 
"a court of this state may not exercise its jurisdiction under this chapter if at the time of the 
commencement of the proceeding a proceeding concerning the custody of the child had been 
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previously commenced in a court of another state having jurisdiction substantially in 
conformity with this chapter, unless the proceeding has been tenninated .... " 
The statute accordingly requires the court, before hearing a child custody proceeding, 
to examine the court documents and other infonnation supplied by the parties pursuant 
relating to other custody proceedings. Utah Code § 788-13-206(2). If that review reveals 
that a "child custody proceeding was previously commenced in a court in another state 
having jurisdiction substantially in accordance with this chapter, 
... the court of this state shall stay its proceeding and communicate with 
the court of the other state. If the court of the state having jurisdiction 
substantially in accordance with this chapter does not determine that the court 
of this state is a more appropriate forum, the court of this state shall dismiss 
the proceeding. (Emphasis added) 
A communication between the lower court in this case and the courts in Mexico could 
have been used to obtain other infonnation relating to the cases in Mexico,judicial procedure 
in Mexico or to address any related concerns of either court. The process of communication 
could have been used to conduct evidentiary hearings, hold hearings, etc. Utah Code§§ 788-
13-110, 111 and 112 (2008). In this case, the court committed error in not staying the 
proceeding, carefully reviewing the materials supplied by the parties and then communicating 
with the court in Mexico that Father contended had jurisdiction in the matter. 
The failure of the trial court to evaluate the material supplied by the parties as to the 
existence of other custody proceedings or enforceable orders and then communicate with the 
Mexico court was a breach and violation of the statutory mandate given to courts under the 
UUCCJEA. The Utah appellate courts have held that "[a] failure to exercise discretion is 
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generally encompassed within the meaning of abuse of discretion." State v. Montiel, 2005 
UT 48, ii 9, 122 P.3d 571, 575. "A district court's mistake oflaw may constitute an abuse 
of its discretion." Snow, Christensen & Marteneau v. Lindberg, 2013 UT 15, ii 17, 299 P .3d 
1058, 1064 ( citation, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted). If this Court does not 
hold, as Mother advocates, that the evidence submitted to the court clearly dispels any notion 
that there were prior enforceable custody order or simultaneous proceedings at the time the 
petition was filed, the matter should be remanded with directions that the trial court 
communicate with the Mexico court in accordance with the statute. 
C. Summa,y. 
Mother respectfully submits that the documents and infonnation supplied by the 
parties establish the original divorce/custody case in Mexico was dismissed by order dated 
F ebmary 8, 2013 (nine months before the petition in this case was filed) and all orders in that 
case rescinded by the same order. Further, that the no-fault divorce decree entered in Mexico 
only dissolved the marriage of the parties and did not attempt to adjudicate custody and did 
not reserve any right for the parties to continue litigating in that case. Finally, Mother 
submits that the best evidence of the validity of her arguments is that in the nearly 2 ½ years 
since the dismissal of the original divorce/custody case in Mexico, Father has not been able 
to reactivate the original divorce/custody case, the no-fault case, or have any orders therein 
reissued. Lastly, Father certainly would not have filed an entirely new action in Mexico after 
the petition in this case was filed, if he had any chance of reviving the previously filed 
actions in Mexico. 
32 
III: THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY WEIGHED THE 
EVIDENCE AND FAILED TO ACCEPT THE ALLEGATIONS 
IN THE VERIFIED PETITION AS TRUE. 
The orders entered by the lower court in this case holding that Utah does not have 
subject matter jurisdiction do not disclose the method by which the court reached that 
conclusion. The factual findings, included in the lower court's orders, are legally 
insufficient. Utah appellate courts have emphasized that a "trial court abuses its discretion 
when it fails to enter specific, detailed findings. Findings are adequate only if they are 
sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the 
ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached." Hall v. Hall, 858 P .2d 1018, I 021 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) ( citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
This appeal follows the lower court's act in granting Father's motion to dismiss based 
upon the alleged absence of subject matter jurisdiction. Addendum B, C and D. A motion to 
dismiss based upon the absence of subject matter jurisdiction is controlled by Rule l 2(b )( 1) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The Utah appellate courts have been clear that in adjudicating a motion to dismiss 
based upon the lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court is to accept the factual allegations 
in the petition as true and to make all reasonable inferences therefrom. Oakwood Vil/. LLC 
v. Albertson, Inc., 2004 UT 101, PP 8-9, 104 P.3d 1226; Peterson v. Delta Air Lines, 2002 
UT App 56, 42 P.3d 1253; Atiya v. Salt Lake Coun(v, 852 P.2d I 007 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); 
Hurst v. Highway Dep 't, 16 Utah 2d 153, 397 P.2d 71, 72 (1964); Giro/a v. Roussille, 81 
Nev. 661,408 P.2d 918, 919 (1965) (motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) is only 
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appropriate when lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter appears on the face of the 
pleading). Importantly, uncertainty as to the facts relevant to assessing the court's subject 
matter jurisdiction will make it inappropriate to grant a motion to dismiss under Rule 
12(b)(l). Mallo,y v. Brigham Young Univ., 2012 UT App 242,285 P.3d 1230; rev. on other 
grounds, Mallory v. Brigham Young Univ., 2014 UT 27,332 P.3d 922. 
Mother's verified petition alleged all the specific facts required by the UUCCJEA to 
establish subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically the petition alleged the facts necessary to 
establish that Utah was the home state of the children at the time of the filing of the petition; 
that the prior original divorce/custody action in Mexico had been dismissed and orders issued 
therein rescinded; and that the no-fault proceeding did not undertake any action to dispose 
of custody related issues. Rec. 1, 8, 11, 17 and 53. Accordingly, the court should have denied 
the motion to dismiss based upon the presumptions afforded the verified petition and the 
failure to do so constitutes reversible error. 
A. The Court's Weighing of the Evidence or Consideration of Evidence 
Outside the Pleadings Constituted Error. 
The only reasonable explanation as to how the lower court could arrive at factual 
findings that contravene the specific allegations in the verified petition and admitted by 
Father's pleadings, is that the court conducted some kind of prohibited undisclosed fact 
finding process and weighing of evidence that resulted in the findings made by the court. 
Rule 12(b )( 6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure al lows a party to file a motion to 
dismiss for "failing to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted." The rule 
then provides that if "matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the 
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court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided 
in Rule 56 .... " Although Rule I 2(b )(1 ), which is the basis of Father's motion in this case, 
does not provide a similar provision for the conversion to summary judgment when outside 
material are relied upon by the court in its decision, this court has consistently prohibited the 
weighing of evidence in adjudicating a motion to dismiss under Rule l 2(b )( 1 ). 
Importantly, this Court has noted that the purpose of the Rule l 2(b )( 6) conversion 
provision is "to allow parties an adequate opportunity to rebut materials outside the 
pleadings." Spoons v. Lewis, 1999 Ut 82, 987 P.2d 36; see also Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Utah 
Farm Prod. Cred Ass 'n, 587 P.2d 151 (Utah 1978). Thus, while noting that the offering of 
affirmative evidence does not automatically convert a Rule 12(b )(1) motion in to one for 
summary judgment, "uncertainty as to the facts relevant to assessing the court's subject 
matter jurisdiction will make it inappropriate to grant a motion to dismiss under rule 12(b )( 1 ) . 
. . . " Mall01~v v. Brigham Young Univ., 2012 UT App 242, 285 P.3d 1230; rev. on other 
grounds, Mal/01y v. Brigham Young Univ., 2014 UT 27, 332 P.3d 922. 
In Spoons, supra, while the Utah Supreme Court rejected Spoon's argument that the 
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b )(1) had been converted to a summary judgment by the 
court's acceptance of documents outside the pleadings, it reversed the dismissal of Spoon's 
complaint for failure to file the required Governmental Immunity Act claim. See Spoons, 
1999 UT 82, ii 7, 987 P.2d 36. The Supreme Court explained that the complaint alleged 
generally that the judge had engaged in a conspiracy but did not include enough factual detail 
to determine the context in which the judge allegedly did so. Id. The Court concluded that 
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the dismissal was premature because, if the plaintiff could "maintain any viable claims that 
[ the judge] engaged in a conspiracy occmTing outside the perfonnance of her duties, not 
within the scope of her employment, and not under color of authority, the [UGIA 's] notice 
of claim provisions would not apply [ and the district court would have jurisdiction to 
entertain the suit]." Id. 
The reasoning of the Court is consistent with the general prohibition against a court 
weighing evidence when considering motions to dismiss or for summary judgment. The law 
is clear that the trial court cannot weigh contradictory evidence or determine credibility when 
deciding whether dismissal or summary judgment is appropriate. See IHC Health Servs., Inc. 
v. D & K Mgmt., 2008 UT 73, iJ 18, 196 P.3d 588; Pigs Gun Club, Inc. v. Sanpete County, 
2002 UT 17; Anda/ex Res., Inc. v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1046 (Utah Ct.App.1994). 
B. The Findings and Conclusions Improperly Weigh the Evidence. 
The relevant findings and conclusions in the court's orders are set out in the Statement 
of Facts. Statement of Facts, supra, iii! 32 and 33. A review of the contents of the Order of 
Dismissal dated 12/5/2014 illustrates Mother's position. In paragraphs 9 and 10 of that order 
(Addendum B), the court finds the court in Mexico, hearing the original divorce/custody 
case, confirmed its jurisdiction over child custody proceedings and reserved the parties rights 
as subject to further litigation. id. The problem with the finding is that it reflected the status 
of the case in November 2010. The findings and conclusions do not explain how that 
jurisdiction survived the order of February 8, 2013, where the judge in the original 
36 
divorce/custody case dismissed the entire case and rescinded all orders previously entered 
by that com1. Id., Rec. 1-7, Addendum E. 
Paragraph IO of the court's findings states that "no Mexico court has vacated the 
order" is contradicted by the order of February 8, 2013, supplied to the court by both parties. 
There is no finding or evidence that, as of the November 18, 2013, filing of the petition in 
this case, there was any standing order relating to custody in Mexico or any ongoing 
proceedings relating to custody in progress. 
In paragraph 12, the court finds that Mexico has jurisdiction over both parties and 
home-state jurisdiction over the children. Further, the paragraph recites that the jurisdiction 
was continuing. Id. The paragraph fails to recognized that as of the date the petition was 
filed, Mexico did not have jurisdiction over Mother and that it no longer had "home-state" 
jurisdiction over the children. Further, the paragraph fails to mention the undisputed fact that 
the court in Mexico asserting jurisdiction had, on its own initiative, dismissed the action and 
rescinded all orders on February 8, 2013, nine months before the petition was filed in this 
case. 
Paragraph 16 concludes that Mother has to modify the parties' custodial rights as 
articulated in Mexico and that Mexico has continuing jurisdiction over custody proceedings. 
Id. The paragraph is silent as to how Mother is to modify an order that was rescinded by the 
issuing court in Mexico and resurrect a proceeding in Mexico that the court, on its own 
initiative, dismissed. 
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Even if findings were permitted on a motion to dismiss, therefore, the findings and 
conclusions of the court are simply contrary to the undisputable evidence in the case. Utah 
was the home state of the children at the time the petition was filed. At the time of filing, 
Mexico had no existing child custody orders in place and no proceedings existed where child 
custody was an issue. As argued above, if Father had an enforceable custody order in Mexico 
or had access to an on-going proceeding, he certainly would have proceeded in one of the 
existing Mexico actions to obtain enforcement orders rather than filing, after Mother's 
petition was filed, a new action in Mexico. Mother submits that all the findings and 
conclusions of the court relating to jurisdiction must be rejected and reversed. 
IV: THE CRIMINAL ACTION FILED IN MEXICO IS NOT A 
"SIMULTANEOUS PROCEEDING" REQUIRING UT AH 
COURTS TO DEFER JURISDICTION. 
Contrary to the lower court's findings, the criminal case m Mexico is not a 
"simultaneous proceedings" under the UUCCJEA that can be used as a basis for Utah to 
defer jurisdiction because Mexico, in the criminal case, did not "have[] jurisdiction 
substantially in confonnity with the [jurisdictional requirements of the UUCCJEA]." Utah 
Code§ 78B-13-206 (2008). Statement of Facts, supra, iii! 32-33. 
By way of background, Father, in his original motion to dismiss, relied on the original 
divorce/custody action in Mexico and the separate no-fault proceeding to base his claim that 
jurisdiction under the UUCCJEA resided in Mexico. When Mother demonstrated, in her 
response, that at the time the petition was filed, the original divorce/custody action in Mexico 
had been dismissed and all orders vacated, Father evolved another strategy. That strategy 
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was based on the notion that Mexico had commenced a criminal proceeding against Mother 
for taking the children out of Mexico and that proceeding, according to Father, constituted 
a "simultaneous proceeding" under the UUCCJEA and required Utah to defer jurisdiction. 
That argument was incorporated in the contents of the Order of Dismissal dated 12/5/2014, 
paragraphs 18 and 19. Addendum B, Statement of Facts, supra, ilil 32 and 33. 
The facts relevant to understanding the criminal action can be summarized as follows. 
On June 30, 2010, the Mexican court in the original divorce/custody case issued an order 
granting Mother "custodia definitivia" over the minor children. Addendum A, pp. 4-6. 
Mother, who was represented by counsel, believed it was an order tantamount to a sole 
custody award and that she was now free to leave Mexico if she so desired. In August 2010, 
each of the parties appealed the June 30, 2010 order. On November 25, 2010, the court in 
which the separate no-fault case had been filed entered a no-fault divorce decree. Id. 
In December 2010, Mother left Mexico with the minor children and went directly to 
Orem, Utah, where the Mother, maternal grandmother and the two children have resided ever 
since. The children have, by all accounts thrived. The children are excellent students, 
engaged in a wide array of extracurricular programs. The children are well entrenched in 
their lives and in the community that surrounds them. Id. Rec. 458-70, 481-90, 492. 
Father filed a written criminal complaint with the prosecutor prompting the charges 
against Mother. Rec. 14 7. Mother is accused of removing the minor children from Mexico 
in December 20 IO with the intent of changing the children's customary domicile. Rec. 140, 
144-45. The relevant provision is grouped under the "child trafficking" section of Mexico's 
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Federal Criminal Code. Id. Mother has, at all times, fully cooperated in the matter and is 
represented by counsel in those proceedings. Mother and the children with the maternal 
grandmother continue to reside in their home in Orem, Utah. Rec. 458-470, 481-90. 
The criminal prosecution of Mother cannot be characterized as a "simultaneous 
proceeding" under the UUCCJEA and used as a basis for Utah to defer jurisdiction. Utah 
Code § 788-13-206 (2008) established the required elements of a simultaneous proceeding: 
( 1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 788-13-204 [temporary 
emergency jurisdiction], a court of this state may not exercise its jurisdiction 
under this chapter if at the time of the commencement of the proceeding a 
proceeding concerning the custody of the child had been previously 
commenced in a court of another state having jurisdiction substantially 
in conformity with this chapter, unless the proceeding has been terminated 
or is stayed by the court of the other state because a court of this state is a more 
convenient forum under Section 78B-13-207. (Emphasis added) 
These elements are not satisfied here. When the criminal case was commenced on 
September 27, 2012, Mexico did not have home state jurisdiction. Rec. 144. Nor was 
Mexico the home state of the children six months before filing. See Utah Code§ 78B-13-201 
(2008). The children have been out of Mexico since December 2010. The criminal court has 
no jurisdiction over Father or the minor children. Importantly, the criminal court has no 
jurisdiction generally to issue child custody orders. All a criminal com1 could do is affect 
the actions of Mother as it relates to the children in some degree. 
The decision in Meyeres v. Meyeres, 2008 UT App 364, 196 P.3d 604, could not be 
clearer and the ruling more apposite to this case. This Com1 mandated that the Utah court 
must make the decision of whether another state's court has jurisdiction. Id. ii 6, citing Utah 
Code § 78B-13-206(2). A claim by a court of another state of jurisdiction is not binding on 
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the Utah court determination. Id. This Court then cited cases where the challenging state did 
not have home state jurisdiction and therefore did not acquire jurisdiction in accordance with 
the UUCCJEA. Id. See We/ch-Doden v. Roberts, 202 Ariz. 20 I, 42 P .3d I I 66, I I 76 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 2002); Arjona v. Torres, 941 So. 2d 451, 455 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006; In re Burk, 
252 S. W.3d 736, 741 (Tex. App. 2008); Hatch v. Hatch (In re Ka/bes), 2007 WI App 136, 
733 N. W.2d 648 ("[T]he Idaho court did not have jurisdiction to make an initial 
determination of [the child's] custody because [the child's] 'home state' was Wisconsin. The 
Idaho court therefore did not have jurisdiction 'substantially in conformity with [the 
UCCJEA],' and the Wisconsin court was not prohibited from exercising jurisdiction under 
[ the simultaneous proceeding statute]." ( footnote omitted)). 
The court in NB v. GA, 133 Haw. 436,329 P.3d 341 (Haw. Ct. App. 2014) noted that 
the comment to section 206 of the Uniform Act provides that "[ u ]nder this Act, the 
simultaneous proceedings problem will arise only when there is no home State, no State with 
exclusive, continuingjurisdiction and more than one significant connection State." Uniform 
Act § 206 cmt. ( I 997). 
When the criminal case was filed, September 27, 2013, Utah had been the home state 
of the children for nearly three years. Further the original divorce/custody case in Mexico 
was dismissed and all orders rescinded on February 8, 2013, more than seven moths prior to 
the filing. The criminal court did not have jurisdiction over Father or the children and did 
not have authority to enter a custody order. The court in Mexico did not acquire jurisdiction 
in accordance with the UUCCJ EA and therefore cannot be a simultaneous proceeding. The 
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conclusion that the Mexico criminal case was a Hsimultaneous [ custody] proceeding" should 
bereve~ed. ~ 
V: MOTHER DID NOT ENGAGE IN UNJUSTIFIABLE CONDUCT 
THUS ALLOWING UTAH TO DECLINE JURISDICTION. 
The court made a finding that Mother had engaged in unjustifiable conduct and that ~ 
the misconduct justified Utah to decline jurisdiction. Findings of Fact, ilil 32-33. The 
underlying statute is Utah Code § 788-13-208 (2008). In relevant part, the statute states: 
Id. 
Jurisdiction declined by reason of conduct. (I) Except as otherwise provided 
in Section 788-13-204 or by other law of this state, if a court of this state has 
jurisdiction under this chapter because a person invoking the jurisdiction has 
engaged in unjustifiable conduct, the court shall decline to exercise its 
jurisdiction unless: (a) the parents and all persons acting as parents have 
acquiesced in the exercise of jurisdiction; (b) a court of the state otherwise 
having jurisdiction under Sections 788-13-201 through 788-13-203 
determines that this state is a more appropriate forum under Section 788-13-
207; or ( c) no other state would have jurisdiction under Sections 788-13-201 
through 788-13-203. 
(2) If a court of this state declines to exercise its jurisdiction pursuant to 
Subsection (I), it may fashion an appropriate remedy to ensure the safety of 
the child and prevent a repetition of the wrongful conduct, including staying 
the proceeding until a child custody proceeding is commenced in a court 
having jurisdiction under Sections 788-13-201 through 78B-13-203. 
Mother alleged in her verified Petition the facts and circumstances that existed that 
prompted her to move the children to Utah. Rec. 1, ilil 11, 12, 458-470, 481-90. The court 
conducted no hearing relating to the matter and accordingly, pursuant to the cases discussing 
Rule l 2(b )(1) discussed above, the allegations in the Petition are sufficient to survive a 




marriage for many years (See Addendum A, p. 4). While Judge Kimball did not make 
express findings relating to the verbal and emotional abuse that Father did or did not inflict 
on Mother, he analyzed the facts and made findings as to the abuse that Father was 
responsible for in relation to the minor children. Id. at pp. 8-9. As it related to the 
relationship between Mother and Father, Judge Kimball simply noted the contents of the 
psychological reports and then stated, that "[ e ]ven if some of the al legations are true [ of 
abuse relating to Mother], they have not been proven by clear and convincing evidence ... 
. Id. at 9. 
Based upon the allegations in the Petition of physical, verbal and emotional abuse and 
the lack of any explicit findings by Judge Kimball that the spousal abuse did not occur, there 
is no basis under the statute to decline jurisdiction. 
Additionally, even if there was serious misconduct on the part of the Petitioner, the 
exceptions contained in the statute would apply. As set out above, serious misconduct could 
be a basis to decline jurisdiction "unless: ... ( c) no other state would have jurisdiction under 
Sections 788-13-20 I through 78B-13-203." Id. As argued above, there is no basis in the 
UCCJEA for a finding that Mexico has jurisdiction in this matter. There was no prior 
custody order that remained in effect that could be modified. There was no proceeding in 
place when the Petition was filed. Crucially, Mexico is no longer the home state of the 
children and has not held that designation since 20 I 0, four years ago. 
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The trial court's finding that Mother engaged in unjustifiable conduct was improper 
on a motion to dismiss, and was contrary to the undisputable evidence. The judgment of the 
trial court should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The order of the court dismissing this case based upon a lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction should be reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings consistent 
with the UUCCJEA. 
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Opinion 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
This matter is before the court on Juan Pahlo Matas-Vidal's 
("Petitioner" or "Mr. Matas-Vidal") Petition for Immediate 
Return of Children to Petitioner Pursuant to the Hague 
Convention and the International Child Abduction Remedies 
Act ("ICARA"). The court initially set a hearing on the 
Petition for June I 8. 2013. At that hearing. however. 
requested that the court continue the hearing to allow her to 
obtain counsel and to respond to the Petition. The court then 
rescheduled the hearing for June 28, 2013, and the hearing 
took place on that date. At the hearing, Petitioner [*2] was 
represented hy David S. Dolowitz and James M. Hunnicutt. 
Respondent was represented hy Clayton A. Simms and Staci 
Visser. 
Prior to June 28. 2013 hearing. the court carefully reviewed 
the Petition. the Response to the Petition (the "Response 
Brief"''), and all affidavits and exhibits that had been 
provided to the court. At the June 28, 2013 hearing, 
Petitioner requested an opportunity to reply to Ms. 
Libbcy-Aguilera's Response, which had been filed the 
evening hcforc the hearing. Petitioner's reply (the "Reply 
Brief"'') was filed on July I 9. 2013. 1 The court has now 
carefully reviewed the Reply Brief. along with all exhibits 
accompanying the brief. 2 Now. having carefully considered 
all of the evidence submitted. along with the relevant 
authorities on the legal issues presented, the court renders 
the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Order. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. GE~l-:R,\L FACTL,\L BACKGIWL~I) 
Petitioner claims that his ex-wi l'c wrongfully removed the 
parties' two minor children. SM-L and RM-L, from their 
habitual residence in Mexico City. Mexico, in December 
20 IO or January 2011. He contends that Respondent wilfully 
disobeyed the orders of the Mexican Court. which had given 
Respondent Susan Consuelo Libbey-Aguilera. also knmvn him custody rights and had prohihitcd Ms. Libbey-Aguilera 
as Brooke Robinson ("Respondent" or "Ms. from removing the couple's children from their hahitual 
1 The court initially set a deadline of July 12. 20 I 3. hut the parties stipulated to a one-week extension. until July 19. 2013. and the court 
permilled the extension. 
2 The court has also considered Respondent's Corrections LO Respondent's Exhibits (Docket No. 33). Petitioner·s Response to the 
Coi,-ections ( Docket No. 34 ). and a lener P 3) from the social worker who has recl·ntly met with the children. See Sealed Docket No. 
35. 
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residence in Mexico. Petitioner further argues that 
Respondent's allegations of domestic violence arc untrue 
and were fabricated long after the divorce proceedings to 
alienate the children from him. He contends that Respondent. 
after removing the children to the United States. hid the 
children from him hy having her name changed through a 
court proceeding in the state of Idaho and hy changing the 
names of their minor children in their school records. 
Petitioner asks this court to return the children to Mexico 
City so that the custody issues may be resolved there. 
Respondent, however. contends that the Mexican court had 
awarded her sole custody and had dissolved the [*4] orders 
preventing her from leaving Mexico. Therefore, she argues, 
she did not wrongfully remove the children from Mexico. 
She also claims that she and the children were victims of 
domestic violence at the hands of Petitioner, which is why 
she fled Mexico. She has asserted several reasons why the 
607, 651 A.2d I 077 (N .J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1994 ); see also 
Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060. I 063 (6th Cir. 1996). 
II. HISTORY OF CASE 
Petitioner filed the instant action on June 7, 2013. At the 
same time, he filed a Motion for a Temporary Restraining 
Order, Order to Show Cause, Writ of Assistance, and 
Request for Immediate Return of Minor Children (the 
"Motion for a TRO"). On June 7, 2013, the court granted the 
Motion for a TRO and entered an Order (the "June 7, 2013 
Order"), which, among other things, prohibited Ms. 
Libbey-Aguilera from interfering with the children being 
taken into protective custody. 3 The June 7, 2013 Order also 
stated that the court would hold an immediate hearing after 
the Order was served to determine whether the court should 
order the return of the children to Petitioner to allow him to 
immediately return with them to Mexico. 4 
children should not he sent back to Mexico. On June 14. 2013, the United States [*6] of America filed 
an Emergency Motion to Intervene, Request for Stay of 
B. LEGAL BACKGROL:~I) 
This action has heen brought pursuant to the Hague 
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction (the "Hague Convention" or the "Convention"), 
which has been implemented in the United States by the 
International Child Abduction Remedies Act (''I CARA"). 42 
U.S.C. §§ 11601-11610. The Hague Convention was adopted 
to protect children from the adverse effects of being 
wrongfully removed to or retained in a foreign country and 
to establish procedures for their return. See Ohlander v. 
Larson, 114 F.3d 1531. 1534 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing the 
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International 
Child Abduction. Dec. 23, 198 L Prcamhle. 51 Fed. Reg. 
10494. 10.498 ( 1986)). "The Convention is meant to provide 
for a child's prompt return once it has been established the 
child has been 'wrongfully removed' to or retained in 
1*51 any affiliated state." Id. (quoting Convention. art. 1 ). 
The court's role is not to make traditional custody decisions 
hut to determine in what jurisdiction the children should be 
physically located so that the proper jurisdiction can make 
those custody decisions. Loos \'. Manuel. 278 N.J. Super. 
~ See Docket No. 5 
_. Id. 
~ Docket No. 6. 
Temporary Restraining Order and Hearing. 5 The reason for 
United States' motion was that the United States believed 
there was a conflict between this court's June 7, 2013 Order 
and a previous Order entered by a Magistrate Judge of this 
court in a criminal Extradition proceeding involving 
Respondent. 6 In the motion, the United States explained 
that the Government of Mexico had asked the United States. 
through diplomatic channels, for the provisional arrest of 
Ms. Libbey-Aguilera for the purpose of extradition for her 
alleged perpetration of Child Trafficking under Mexican 
law. Pursuant to an arrest warrant signed by a Magistrate 
Judge on May 9, 2013, Ms. Libbey-Aguilera had been 
arrested, and an initial appearance had been held on May I 0, 
2013. The Magistrate Judge ordered. among other things, 
that (I) Ms. Libbey-Aguilera wear a GPS ankle monitor. 
report to pretrial services daily. and maintain her current 
residence; and (2) the two minor children were to remain 
with Ms. Libbey-Aguilera at her residence; 7 and (3) the 
passports of Ms. Libbey-Aguilera and her children be turned 
over to pretrial services; and that 1*7] (4) Ms. 
Libbey-Aguilera and the minor children were not to leave 
the state without the permission of the Court. 8 Accordingly. 
'' The Extradition proceeding is Case No. 2: I 3M.I 151. A probable cause hearing has been set for August 12. 2013. 
7 The United States maintained that this court's June 7. 2013 Order directing the minor children to he taken into protective custody 
was in conllict with the i\'lagistrate Judge·s Order for the children to rc.:main with Ms. Aguilera. 
s See Case No. 2: 13:'vlJ 151. Docket No. 6. Order Selling Conditions of Release al 2. 
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the United States asked this court for permission to intervene 
in the instant case and also to stay the proceedings, 
including the court's Order dated June 7. 2013 until such 
time as the court could hold a hearing to address the 
apparent conflict in the two Orders. On June 17. 20 I 3. the 
court set a hearing for June 18, 2013. 
The apparent conflict in the two court Orders had prevented 
the Orem Police Department from contacting the Department 
of Child and Family Services ("DCSF"). Todd Gabler. a 
private investigator in the State of Utah Department of 
Public Safety, who was working with Petitioner, informed 
the court, through an affidavit [*8] filed on June I 8. 2013, 
that. on June 13. 2013. he had served a copy of this Court's 
June 7, 2013 Order on the Orem Police Department. 9 At 
that time, he had asked the officers to contact him when the 
Order was to be served on Ms. Libbey-Aguilera. He also 
served a copy of the Order on Ms. Libbey-Aguilera on June 
16. 2013. He stated in his Affidavit that, moments after 
serving Ms. Libbey-Aguilera with the Order, the Orem 
Police Department responded to Ms. Libbey-Aguilcra's 
residence, and he gave the officers another copy of the 
Order. According to Mr. Gabler, the officers refused to 
contact DCFS to pick up the children. as directed by the 
June 7 Order, because Ms. Libbey-Aguilera had produced 
the Magistrate Judge's Order, which she claimed required 
her to keep the children with her at her place of residence. 
10 
During the June I 8, 20 I 3 hearing, the court permiued the 
United States to intervene for the purpose of pointing out 
the apparent conflict between this court's June 7 Order and 
the Magistrate Judge's Order Setting Conditions of Release 
in the Extradition proceeding. At the June 18. 2013 hearing. 
Ms. Libbey-Aguilera was not represented by counsel, hut 
" See Docket No. 8. 
IO Id. 
11 Docket No. 13. 
1 
=' Docket No. 14. 
1
' Docket No. 15. 
1
•
1 Docket Nos. 18. 19. respectively. 
1
~ Docket No. 21. 
counsel [*9) who had been appointed pursuant to the 
Criminal Justice Act ("CJA") to represent her in her 
criminal Extradition proceeding, Clayton Simms, appeared 
as a friend of the court. He explained that Ms. 
Libbey-Aguilera had just been served with the actual 
Petition on that day and that she had not had an opportunity 
to find counsel to represent her. Mr. Simms requested that 
the court continue the hearing to allow Ms. Libbey-Aguilera 
time to find counsel. The court granted the request and 
continued the hearing until June 28, 20 I 3. 
On June 21. 2013, Mr. Simms requested that, due to the 
time-sensitive nature of this proceeding and his familiarity 
with the facts and circumstances of this case. he be 
appointed as Ms. Libbey-Aguilera's counsel in the instant 
matter because it is ancillary to his CJA appointment in the 
Extradition matter. 11 The court granted the request. 12 
On June 24. 2011, Ms. Libbey-Aguilera filed a Motion to 
Appoint Guardian ad Litem ("GAL") for the two children 
involved in this mauer. u Mr. Matas-Vidal opposed the 
motion on June 25, 20 I 3, and Ms. Libbey-Aguilera filed a 
Reply on June 26, 2013. 1•1 The court issued an Order on 
June 26, 2013. deferring 1*10) ruling on the motion until 
after the June 28. 2013 hearing. 15 In the Order, the court 
explained that it intended to proceed with the scheduled 
June 28 hearing and that if it became apparent at the hearing 
that a GAL would be helpful to the court's determination, 
the court would appoint one and hold a subsequent hearing. 
I(, 
At the June 28. 2013 hearing. the court heard argument from 
counsel on the merits of the Petition. 17 At the hearing. the 
court also inquired about permitting Petitioner to sec his 
11
' Ultimately. the court did not find that the appointment of a GAL would he helpful to the court's resolution of this matter and has 
therefore never ordered thal a GAL be appointed. 
17 At the hearing. Petitioner's counsel indicated that hecause Rcsponden1·s Response Brief and exhihils had heen filed late on June 27. 
2013. he had not had time to thoroughly revie\v everything or to respond to :vis. Lihhcy-Aguilcra·s arguments. He asked for an 
opportunity lo file a reply to her response. and the court set a deadli11L' of July 12. 2013 for the Reply Brief. which deadline was later 
exlcnded. with permission of lhc court. to July 19. 2013. 
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children. 18 After some discussion among the parties, they trip to Texas, taking the two children with her without 
agreed to arrange a time and place for a supervised visit 
within the next few days. while Mr. Matas-Vidal was still in 
the United States. Subsequently. because of the children's 
reluctance about seeing their father, the parties decided that 
the children should meet with a reunification therapist prior 
to their first meeting. 19 As of the date of this Order, it 
appears that the children f*ll] have met at least twice with 
a therapist but have not yet visited with their father. 20 At the 
June 28 hearing, the court also conducted an in camera 
interview of each of the minor children, without any 
attorneys present. 
III. FINDINGS OF FACT 
Petitioner 1*121 and Respondent were married in Mexico 
City on June 26. 1999. Petitioner is a Mexican national, and 
Respondent has dual citizenship in Mexico and the United 
States. as her father was a United States citizen and her 
mother was a Mexican citizen. SM-L was born in Mexico 
City in May 200 I, and RM-L was born in Mexico City in 
November 2003. At some point when the children were very 
young, the couple discussed the possibility of moving to the 
United States. but that possibility never came to fruition 
because Petitioner could not find adequate-paying work in 
the United States. The children were granted United States 
citizenship in 2005. In October 2006. Ms. Libbey-Aguilera 
purchased a condominium in San Antonio, Texas and 
sometimes visited there. For the duration of their marriage, 
however, Petitioner. Respondent, and their two children 
always lived in Mexico City. They lived there until the time 
Ms. Libbey-Aguilera removed the children from Mexico to 
Utah in December 20 I 0. 
There appears to have been significant discord in the 
marriage for many years. When Petitioner expressed his 
desire for a divorce in September 2007. Respondent took a 
[*13] seeking permission from their father. The 
circumstances of her return several days later are disputed 
but immaterial to the resolution of this matter. In any event. 
after her return to Mexico. Petitioner filed for divorce in 
early October 2007 in Mexico City. 
On October 16, 2007, the Mexican court issued an Order 
barring the removal of the children from Mexico. Petitioner 
had sought such an Order because of the previous incident 
when Respondent had taken the children to Texas without 
his permission. On December 14. 2007. after a mediation on 
December 11, 2007. the court ordered that Ms. 
Libbey-Aguilera would be granted the provisional physical 
custody of the children at their marital domicile. Petitioner 
would have visits on Saturdays and Sundays every other 
week from l 0:00 a.m. - l :00 p.m. at the Supervised 
Visitation and Socialization Center. It was also ordered that 
Mr. Matas-Vidal may socialize with his children on holidays, 
the children· s birthdays, and fifty percent of school vacations. 
with prior notice and mutual agreement of both parties. 21 
The December 14, 2007 Order again prohibited Respondent 
from taking the children out of Mexico. 22 
On June 30, 2010, the Mexican court issued an order 
granting "custodia definitivcl' to Respondent (the "June 30. 
20 IO Order"). 23 Respondent argues that the Order granted 
her "sole custody" and dissolved any restrictions on her 
travel outside of Mexico. Petitioner. however, has provided 
evidence that the English translation of "custodia definitiva" 
is not "sole custody," as that term is understood in the 
United States, and he has also provided evidence that, 
because he still had custody rights, Respondent was still 
prohibited from leaving Mexico. 2•1 The June 30, 20 l O Order 
provided that Mr. Matas-Vidal "has the obligation and 
essential human right to visit and go out with his children . 
. . on Saturdays and Sundays ... every other weekend. 
1 
x Petitioner had sought to sec his children al the initial June 12 hearing. hut the court declined to order a visitation at that time. 
19 The parties had reached this agreement while the court was still conducting its in camera interviews of the children. After the 
interviews. the court praised this agreement hy the parties and confirmed to counsel that the children were scared to sec their father. See 
Transcript. Docket No. 25 pp. 44-46. 
='
0 See Sealed Docket No. 35. Letter from Paul \\'. Dawson. MSW. LCSW. 
='' These visits would not have been at 1*141 the Socialization Center. and it docs not appear that Respondent ever permitted these 
visits. 
;,;, See Docket No. 22-1. Respondent's Affidavit in Support to Objections to Petition for Immediate Return. p. 4: see also Docket No. 
28-3. Ex. 5(h) Temporary Custody & Support Order. English Translation. 
2
·
1 Docket No. 28. Ex. 14(h). The Order was published on July 12. 2010. Respondent initially claimed that the Order was entered on 
July 12. 2009. hut there is no dispute now that the Order was published on July 12. 2010. following proceedings on June JO. 20 I 0. 
24 Docket No. >I. Ex. 2. 
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Visitations shall begin on Saturdays at IO AM and end on 
Sundays at 6 PM." 25 These visits were not ordered to take 
place at the Supervised Visitation and [*151 Socialization 
Center. Mr. Matas-Vidal was to "pick the children up at they 
place where they live with their mother and return them to 
the same place." 26 
In August 2010, each parent appealed the June 30. 20 I 0 
Order. Mr. Matas-Vidal appealed the Order because. among 
other things. he believed that Ms. Libbey-Aguilera was 
obstructing his ability to visit with the children and he 
thought further psychological testing would assist the court 
in its determination. 27 During 20 I 0. new psychological 
examinations were in progress but were not filed with the 
court until February 20 I I-after Respondent had fled 
Mexico. 
On November 25, 2010. a bifurcated decree of divorce was 
entered. Thus. the divorce had become final, but the issue of 
child custody [*161 and support were still being litigated. 
During the custody litigation. Petitioner exercised all 
visitation awarded to him by the Mexican court. He regularly 
exercised his right of access until the children were removed 
from Mexico. On January 8. 20 I I and January 9. 2011, he 
went to the Supervised Family Interaction Center hut Ms. 
Libbey-Aguilera and the boys did not show up. He then 
confirmed that they no longer lived at their marital home 
and was informed by the boys' school that, as of December 
16, 20 I 0, the boys had stopped attending school. 
In December 2010, Respondent surreptitiously removed the 
children from Mexico to the United States. 28 She came 
directly to Orem. Utah and enrolled the children in school 
on December 21. 2010. They have been continuously 
enrolled in the same school since January 20 I I. Teachers 
and administrators have repeatedly noted their good behavior 
:.>:'i Docket No. 28. Ex. 14(h) at p. 14 (English Translation). 
26 lti. 
and academic excellence. 29 The children are both on a 
competitive swim team. SM-L was a cub scout and now 
participates regularly as a boy scout. He also is on a soccer 
team. RM-L is a cub scout. They were both baptized as 
members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints 
and attend meetings regularly. [*17) SM-L received the 
Aaronic Priesthood when he turned twelve. They both spend 
substantial time with their maternal grandmother. Respondent 
began working for the Provo School District on March 7, 
2011 and has remained gainfully employed with the district 
since that time. 
On January 7, 2011, after Respondent had removed the 
children from Mexico, the Mexican appeals court revoked 
the June 30, 2010 Order. On February 4, 2011, the second 
set of psychological reports were issued. 30 While the 
English translations of these reports are somewhat difficult 
to analyze. it is clear that the psychological report on the 
children found that they did not have emotional indications 
that were consistent with a profile of a child that had 
suffered violence. 31 In addition, while the boys both had a 
negative view of their father, the psychologist noted their 
perception was "without sustaining real or valid experiences" 
1*181 and that their attitudes "are determined by induction 
and manipulation which their mother has exercised upon 
them." 32 
The psychological report on Ms. Libbey-Aguilera found, 
among other things, that she had a "tendency to lie," 
dysfunctional behavior patterns which may affect in a 
negative manner the interaction within her family and social 
environment," that she "tends to carry out manipulation 
attitudes in particular with her children," and that she had 
"aggressive or violent tendencies, especially of a verbal 
n It is unclear why Ms. Lihhey-Aguilcra appealed. hut she has not disputed that she appealed the June 30. 20 IO Order. 
:.>x Respondent claims that she acted on the hclief that the final custody order no longer restricted her from lawfully taking the children 
across the horder 10 the United States. Docket No. 22-1. Respondent's Aff. al p.6. 
29 See Docket No. 22-1. Respondent's Aff. at pp.7-8 antl attached exhibits. 
"
1 The findings in these second psychological reports do 1101 vary significamly from the initial reports. prepared in 2008. See Docket 
No. 28. Ex. 11 (h). 
11 See Docket No. 4-1. Ex. 21-h. p. 7. 
l:.> Docket No. 4-1. Ex. 21-h. pp.4-5. The psychologist noted that the dread the hoys feel ahout their father is "more consistent with 
induction and manipulation altitudes to them than as a result of their own experiences." id. p. 7. and th.it it "is inferred that they have 
been mostly induced or manipulated hy their mother." Id. 
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nature. 33 The report also noted that Ms. Libbey-Aguilera 
now reported taking the children to a private psychological 
evaluation to confirm the use of violence and sexual 
(*19] abuse, which was information Ms. Libbey-Aguilera 
"did not express in her first evaluation." 34 The psychological 
report on Mr. Matas-Vidal staled that there were no 
indications of aggressive or violent tendencies. 35 The 
psychologist found no reason why he should not live 
together with his children. 36 Petitioner suggests that 
Respondent fled before the reports were issued because she 
suspected that they would not be favorable to her. 
On February 9. 2011, in the District Court for the Seventh 
Judicial District in the State of Idaho. Respondent had her 
name legally changed to Brooke Robinson, claiming that 
she needed to change her name because she was "divorcing 
her husband and am seeking to avoid being located hy my 
husband for the reason he has threatened to kill me and my 
family." 37 Respondent and her two children had been Iivino e 
in Orem, Utah from December 20 IO through the present 
time. 
Petitioner [*20) had been looking for his children since he 
realized they were gone in January 2011. He had started to 
try to find Respondent in Texas, believing she was there 
because she had previously purchased a condominium 
there. Because she had changed her name to Brooke 
Robinson in early 2011, and because she had changed the 
boys' names in their school records in October 2011, 38 it 
took Petitioner until earlier this year to discover where his 
children were located. Law enforcement located Respondent 
in Utah in May 2013. The instant Petition was filed on June 
7, 2013. 39 
IV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A. APPLICAHILITY OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION 
The court finds that the Convention applies to this dispute. 
SM-L and RM-L are both under 16 years old; they were 
. n Docket No. 4. Ex. 20-h. pp. 210-212. 
,.i Id. p. 207. 
y, Docket No. 4. p. 183. 191. 
,c, Id. at p. 183. 
habitual residents of Mexico; and both Mexico and the 
United States arc contracting states. •ID See 42 U.S.C. § 
I I 603(e)( I )(A); Hague Conv., art. 3. 
B. WHETHER THE RDIOVAL WAS WRONGFL"L 
The first question the court must address is whether the 
children were "wrongfully removed" [*21] from Mexico, or, 
in other words, whether they were removed in violation of 
a right of custody. Once a petitioner establishes that removal 
was wrongful, the child must he returned unless an exception 
is applicable. Abbott v. Abbott 560 U.S. I, 130 S. Ct. I 983, 
1990. 176 L. Ed. 2d 789 (20 I 0) (citing 42 U.S.C. § § 
l l 603(a)); Blo11di11 \'. Dubois, 189 F.3d 240, 245 (2nd Cir. 
1999); see also 42 U.S.C. § I 160I(a)(4) ("Children who are 
wrongfully removed or retained within the meaning of the 
Convention arc to be promptly returned unless one of the 
narrow exceptions set forth in the Convention applies."). 
Moreover, "I e I vcn where the grounds for one of these 
"narrow" exceptions have been established. the district court 
is not necessarily bound to allow the child to remain with 
the abducting parent." Blo11di11, 189 F.3d at 246 n.4 (quoting 
Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1067) (6th Cir. 1996) 
("I A] federal district court retains, and should usc when 
appropriate, the discretion to return a child, despite the 
existence of a defense, if return would further the aims of 
the Convention.")). 
Petitioner bears the burden of showing by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the removal or retention was wrongful. 
Accordingly, Petitioner [*22) must demonstrate that: 
(A) the child was habitually resident in a given state at 
the time of the removal or retention: 
(B) the removal or retention was in breach of petitioner's 
custody rights under the laws of that state; and 
(C) petitioner was exercising those rights at the time of 
removal or retention . 
·'
7 Docket No. 30-7. Exhihit 7. As required by Idaho law. respondent represented in her name-change petition that she was a resident 
of Idaho. hut Respondent admits now that she was never a resident of Idaho. 
'
8 See Docket No. 28. Ex. 23. 
N Docket No. I . 
. m The court finds unmeritorious Respondent's argument that the children's hahitual residence had shifted to the United States at the 
time of removal. 
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Chafin v. Chafin. 133 S. Ct 1017. 1021. 185 L. Ed. 2d I litigation, the interim ne exeat order from October 16, 2007 
(2013) (quotill[? Hague Conv .. art. 3 ). continued to apply. 45 
Here, the court finds that Petitioner has met his burden of 
showing by a preponderance of the evidence that SM-Land 
RM-L were habitually resident in Mexico City at the time of 
the removal. The children were born in Mexico City and 
never lived anywhere other than Mexico until Respondent 
removed them to the United States in December 2010. 
The court also concludes that the removal was in breach of 
Petitioner's custody rights under Mexican law and that 
Petitioner was exercising those rights at the time of removal. 
Although Respondent claims that she was awarded "sole 
custody" and that any restraints on her ability to take the 
children across the border were dissolved, the court does not 
agree. The July 9. 20 IO Order states that Respondent was 
given "custodia de.finith·a." but that is not the same thing as 
"sole custody." [*23] as discussed below. 41 It is unclear 
why Respondent believed that the Order gave her the right 
to leave Mexico with the children when the June 30. 2010 
Order provided that Mr. Matas-Vidal could visit and socialize 
with his children on Saturdays and Sundays every two 
weeks from Saturday at 10:00 a.m. until Sunday at 6.00 p.m. 
42 
Regardless of which Order applied, however, Petitioner had 
intrinsic ne exeat rights barring the children's removal. If a 
petitioner only has "rights of access'' rather than "rights of 
custody," then the petitioner cannot seek return of the child 
under the Convention. See, e.g., Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1989. 
The issue of "custody" must be [*25] addressed under the 
law of Mexico. See Pesin v. Osorio Rodriguez, 77 F. Supp. 
2d 1277, 1284 (S.D. Fla. 1999); Ohlwuler v. Larson, I 14 
F.3d 153 l, 1541 ( 10th Cir. 1997). Pursuant to Mexico's 
Civil Code, both parents general1y have "rights of custody" 
to their children at all times. See, e.g., Asuncion Mota v. 
Rivera Castillo, 692 F.3d I 08 (2nd Cir. 2012): Whal/on \'. 
Lynn, 230 F.3d 450 (1st Cir. 2000); Saldivar v. Rodela, 879 
F. Supp. 2d 610 (W.D. Tex. 2012). In these cases, the U.S. 
court accepted affidavits from Mexican lawyers describing 
rights of custody in Mexico. 
In this case, Petitioner has provided a declaration by 
Petitioner's Mexican counsel, in which he provides an 
explanation of patria potestas, which means "parental 
authority" in Spanish, and is somewhat akin to the American 
notion of "legal custody," or decision-making authority for 
a minor child. In Spanish, "custodia" refers to what we in 
the United States would call "physical custody." which 
addresses which parent a child lives with. While a Mexican 
court may grant custody to one parent, that does not negate 
Moreover. hoth parties appealed that order in August 2010. the other parent's rights of parental authority. 46 
Under Mexican law. the challenged order had no effect, so 
the ne exeat order from October 16. 2007 remained in 
effect. .n In addition. even the bifurcated divorce decree, 
issued on November 25. 20 I 0, provides that: "both parties 
In Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 176 L. Ed. 
2d 789 (2010), [*26) the United States Supreme Court 
concluded that a ne exeat right is a right of custody under 
stated that no settlement may he reached, since the legal the Convention. See id. at 1990-91. A ne exeat right consists 
status of their minor children whose names are [SM-L and 
RM-L] arc subject (*24) to litigation with the 36th Mexico 
City Family Court." 4--1 Because the June 30, 20 IO order was 
being appealed. and because custody was still subject to 
of the authority to consent before the other parent may take 
the child to another country. See id. at 1987. 
Having considered the various cases cited by the parties, the 
court concludes that Petitioner's patria potestas rights are 
41 The July 9. 2010 Order was ullimatcly revoked on January IO. 2011. See Docket No. 30. Ex. 5 (the Order is mistakenly identified 
as being published on January I 0. 20 I 0. but there is no dispute that it was published on January I 0. 20 I I). Because Respondent had 
already left the coumry. the court cannot rely on the revocation of that Order in considering the status of custody rights as of the <late 
of the wrongful removal. 
•
12 Docket No. 28. Ex. I 4(b). 
·" See Petitioner's Reply Memorandum. Docket No. 31. Ex. 2. which is a Declaration by Petitioner's Mexican allorney clarifying these 
points of Mexican law . 
... , Respondent's Opp'n. Exhibit l7(b) to Document No. 22. near end or first paragraph (emphasis added) . 
. ,-; The rvkxican mun reiterated in September 2011 that the ,u, exeat Order still applied. See Docket No. 4-1. Ex. 23(b). The court has 
not considered this fact in determining whether the removal was wrongful hecause Respondent had already tlcd ivlcxico hy that time. 
The Order. however. lends credence to the legal explanations of Petitioner's allorney in Mexico. as noted helmv. 
•
11
• See Dockel No. 31. Ex. 2. 
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rights of custody under the Hague Convention. Accordingly, In this case, Respondent has not established [*28] by clear 
Respondent's removal of the children from Mexico violated and convincing evidence that there is a grave risk that the 
Petitioner's rights of custody that arose under the laws of return of the children would expose them to physical or 
Mexico and therefore, the removal was wrongful. psychological harm or otherwise place them in an intolerable 
situation. The children would not be returned to a zone of 
As noted previously, once a petitioner establishes that war. famine, or disease. 
removal was wrongful, the child must be returned unless an 
exception is applicable. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1990 (citing 42 
U.S.C. § § I 1603(a)). Respondent, has asserted several 
defenses available under the Hague Convention. which will 
he addressed in turn below 
C. RESPONDENT'S DEFENSES 
I. Article /3 "Grave Harm" Defense 
In addition, while Respondent has alleged that she and the 
children were victims of domestic violence, the court is not 
persuaded that these allegations are entirely true. 47 For 
example, Respondent did not raise any such concerns 
during her divorce proceedings. In fact, in her Answer to the 
Complaint for Divorce, she states "there was an exchange of 
insults. where today the plaintiff [Mr. Matas-Vidal] always 
acted in a mocking way and although he had never 
physically assaulted me, he did it with his attitudes." 48 This 
Respondent contends that there is a grave risk that return of Answer is dated November 22. 2007. well after the parties 
the children would expose them to physical and/or separated on August 5, 2007. In addition, the psychological 
psychological harm. Pursuant to Article 13 of the reports submitted in this case do not suggest that Petitioner 
Convention, a court is not bound to order the return of 
(*27) the child if the person who opposed the return 
establishes that "there is a grave risk that his return would 
expose the child to physical or psychological harm or 
otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation." Art. 
I 3(b). Respondent must establish the grave risk by "clear 
and convincing" evidence. 42. U.S.C. § l l 603(e)(2). 
A "grave risk" of harm from repatriation arises in two 
situations: (I) where returning the child means sending him 
to a zone of war, famine, or disease: or (2) in cases of 
was abusive toward his wife or children or that Respondent 
reported any abuse al that time. Indeed. the initial 
psychological report states that "with regard to the children, 
I Petitioner] was identified with an affective bond 
1*29) toward them, showing interest and concern for them, 
affective and normative toward them, so there arc no 
prnhlems for coexistence." 49 The final report reached the 
same conclusion. 50 
Indeed. the supplemental reports suggest that Respondent 
had manipulated her children to dislike their father. Among 
serious abuse or neglect, or extraordinary emotional other things, the psychologist stated: 
dependence, when the court in the country of habitual 
residence, for whatever reason, may be incapable or 
unwilling to give the child adequate protection. 
In addition, the potential harm to the child must be severe, 
and "[t]he level of risk and danger required to trigger this 
exception has consistently been held to be very high." 
Norden-Powers v. Beveridge, 125 F. Supp. 2d 634, 640 
(E.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing cases). The grave risk involves not 
only the magnitude of the potential harm but also the 
From analysis of obtained information at applied 
instruments. there were not found significant data to 
establish that minor children show fear attitudes to any 
of their parents, becoming important the fact that even 
though they openly express feeling certain dread to 
their father, this results more consistent with induction 
and manipulation attitudes to them than as a result of 
their own experiences. 51 
probability that the harm will materialize. Van de Sande 1·. Also. while Respondent initially submitted a translation of 
Van de Sande, 43 I F.3d 567, 570 (7th Cir. 2005). very negative comments the 1*30] children allegedly made 
47 Even if some of the allegations are true. they have not hcen proven by clear and convincing evidence. and. in any event. the court 
docs not find that they rise to a level of risk and danger that would justify applying this exception . 
.ix Docket No. 28-2. Ex. 4 <JI 9 (emphasis added). 
•
19 Docket No. 28-9. Ex. 11. 
-;o Docket No. 4. pp. I 83. 19 I. 
-;i Docket No. 4-1. Ex. 2l(b) at p. 7. 
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during a mediation. Petitioner pointed out that the translation memories of the occurrences. which the court does not find 
was completely inaccurate (and that it was a fraud upon the to be plausible. given their ages at the time. 58 They also 
court). 52 Respondent later filed Corrections, conceding that appear to have general recollections of their father choking 
the translation submitted was not actually a translation of 
the mediation, but of other reports and hearings and that the 
or spanking them. along with other instances of violence, 
hut these allegations have not been proven by clear and 
inadvertent mistake had been made due to language barriers convincing evidence. 
and time constraints. 53 During the mediation, no allegations 
of abuse were raised, and when SM-L was questioned, he Moreover, the records submitted from the Supervised 
declared he loved and wanted to visit with his father. His 
negative comment to the court was that his father lied to the 
boys by saying he would play with them, then did not. 54 
The family pediatrician never noticed any type of evidence 
that would suggest any type of physical abuse. 55 The 
parties' marriage counselor has also provided an affidavit 
stating that she saw no issues of violence between them, and 
neither party mentioned any violence in the home. 56 
The children's current (*31) fear of their father appears to 
he based primarily (but not exclusively) on one alleged 
"incident" involving each child. When SM-L was 
sixteen-months old, Respondent claims that Petitioner pushed 
him against a step in the bathroom, from which he sustained 
a cut above his right eye and was seen by a plastic surgeon. 
Petitioner claims that a shaky changing table gave way and 
SM-L fell to the floor. 
When RM-L was 15 months old, Respondent claims that 
Petitioner pushed him into a chair resulting in eye injuries. 
Petitioner denies that this happened. 57 While the court 
Visitation Center suggest that. at first, the children did not 
exhibit any fear or reluctance to see their father. Indeed, 
they appeared to demonstrate a warm, loving, and playful 
interaction. 59 Over time, however, they seemed to develop 
more hesitation about [*33) seeing him. which he blames on 
Ms. Libbey-Aguilcra's efforts to alienate the children from 
him. The reason the children most often gave to the 
supervisors about their reluctance to visit with their father 
was that his breath was bad. It seems unlikely that the 
children would provide such an answer if they were actually 
subjected to physical or psychological abuse, and it is 
puzzling that the children did not appear to have any 
reluctance to sec their father during the beginning weeks or 
months of their supervised visits. Indeed. even the Mexican 
Court Order from J unc 30, 20 l 0, upon which Respondent 
relies to argue that she was awarded sole custody. states that 
"there is no danger" in "any of the parents exercising 
custody" and stated that Mr. Matas- Vidal had "the obligation 
and essential human right to visit and out with his minor 
children" every other weekend. 60 
cannot divine what actually happened in these various It is not the function of this court. however. to determine 
alleged incidents. what is clear is that both children discussed whether any domestic violence actually occurred. This court 
these events with the court as though they had clear must determine, in cases where "serious abuse or neglect" 
Docket Nos. 30. 31. 
5
' Docket 33, Corrections to Respondent's Exhibits. The court has no douht that the incorrect translation was inadvertently submitted. 
5-1 Docket No. 30. Ex. I. 2. 
Docket No. 30. Ex. 9. 
5<' Id. 
:,7 He also denies another incident alleged hy Respondent-that he slammed a piano cover shut. therehy injuring RM-L's face. In fact. 
Petitioner claims [*32) that they never even had a piano. 
-:.x Respondent also claims that Petitioner pushed RM-L into a pipe in the yard at the Supervision Center. splilling his lip. Petitioner 
denies that this happened. and the Center Report from June 14. 2008 reported that Petitioner was playing with the children in the garden. 
where they were playing ball and that RM-L accidentally struck his elbow on a tube serving. as a garden fence. There is also a note stating 
that when Petitioner noticed it. he washed it with soap and water. See Docket No. 30. Ex. 10. Given that the visits were supervised and 
that there is a contemporaneous note slating what happened. the court docs not give any credence lo Respondent· s version of this 
incident. The court also docs not give credence to Respondent's claim that Petitioner's hrnthcr arrived at the Visitation Center in October 
2009 to at1emp1 lo kidnap the children. 
"'' See Docket 30. Ex. I 0. 
w Docket No. 28-13. Ex. I 4(b) al page 38 of 40. 
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has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. whether 
Mexico would be [*34) incapable or unwilling to provide 
protection to the children. The court finds that Respondent 
has not demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that 
presumption under [*36] the Convention is that a child shall 
be returned to the state from which he originally was 
wrongfully removed unless both of two conditions arc met: 
(I) one year has elapsed between the date of wrongful 
there is evidence of "serious abuse or neglect." and that even removal and the date proceedings commence: and (2) the 
if there were. she has not demonstrated that Mexican courts child is found to be "now settled in its new environment." 
would be incapable of providing adequate protection. Thus, Lozano v. Alvare-:., 697 F.3d 41, 51 (2nd Cir. 2012). In other 
the court concludes that Article 13 "grave risk" defense does words, if more than one year has elapsed since the date of 
not apply in this case. wrongful removal and the child is now settled in his new 
ii. Article 20 "Public Policy" Defense 
Article 20 of the Convention states, "The return of the child 
under the provisions of Article 12 may be refused if this 
would not be permitted by the fundamental principles of the 
requested State relating to the protection of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms." This is an affirmative defense 
that Respondent must prove by clear and convincing 
evidence. 42 U.S.C. § l I 603(e)(2)(A). This is often referred 
to as the "public policy" defense. The defense is to be 
invoked only on "the rare occasion that return nf a child 
would utterly shock the conscience of the court or offend all 
notions of due process." Souratgar \'. Fair, 720 F.3d 96, 
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 11875, 2013 WL 2631375 at *8 (2nd 
Cir. June 13, 2013) (quoting U.S. State Dcp't. Hague 
International Child Abduction Convention: (*35) Text and 
Legal Analysis, Pub. Notice 957. 51 Fed. Reg. I 0,494, 
l 0,510 (Mar. 26, 1986)). "We note that this defense has yet 
to be used by a federal court to deny a petition for 
repatriation." Id. (citing Fed. Jud. Ctr., The I 980 Hague 
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction: A Guide for Judges 85 (2012)). The court finds 
no merit to this defense and summarily denies it. 
iii. Article 12 "Well-Settled" Def e11se 
Article 12 provides, in relevant part: 
Where a child has been wrongfully removed ... and. at 
the date of the commencement of the proceedings 
before the judicial or administrative authority of the 
Contracting State where the child is. a period of less 
than one year has elapsed from the date of the wrongful 
removal or retention, the authority concerned shall 
order the return of the child forthwith. The judicial or 
administrative authority. even where the proceedings 
have been commenced after the expiration of the period 
of one year referred to in the proceeding paragraph, 
shall also order the return of the child. unless it is 
demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new 
environment. 
environment, the court may - but need not- refuse to 
order repatriation. See Blo11di11 v. Dubois, 238 F.3d 153, I 64 
(2d Cir. 200 I). Put differently, "if more than one year has 
passed. a 'demonstra[tion] that the child is now settled in its 
new environment' may be a sufficient ground for refusing lo 
order repatriation." Id. The standard under Article 12 does 
not call for determining in which location the child is 
relatively better settled, but rather for determining whether 
the child has become so settled in a new environment that 
repatriation would be against the child's hest interest. Id. 
In determining whether a child is settled within the meaning 
of Article I 2, a court considers a number of factors 
[*37] that bear on whether the child has "significant 
connections to the new country." 51 Fed. Reg. at l 0509. 
These factors include: ( l) the child's age; (2) the stability 
and duration of the child's residence in the new environment; 
(3) whether the child attends school or day care consistently: 
(4) whether the child has friends and relatives in the new 
area; (5) the child's participation in community or 
extracurricular school activities, such as team sports, youth 
groups. or school clubs; and (6) the respondent's employment 
and financial stability. In some circumstances, we will also 
consider the immigration status of the child and the 
respondent. In general, this consideration will be relevant 
only if there is an immediate. concrete threat of deportation. 
Although all of these factors. when applicable. may be 
considered in the "settled" analysis, ordinarily the most 
important is the length and stability of the child's residence 
in the new environment. In Re B. Del C.S.B .. 559 F.3d 999. 
I 009 (9th Cir 2009) 
In the instant case.SM-Land RM-L have been in Utah since 
late December. 2010-- for over two and one-half years. The 
court finds that they arc both very well settled. And given 
the boys· 1*381 ages. 12 and 9 ½. respectively. these 
thirty-plus months have been meaningful to the boys. They 
have been consistently enrolled in school since January 
2011. They have missed very few days during those two 
Art. 12 (emphasis added). Accordingly. the default school years. and their academic success has been 
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remarkable. 61 Both boys have many friends, caring 
neighbors, and fellow LOS church members with whom 
they have formed close bonds. Their maternal grandmother 
also frequently cares for them. The children arc active in 
their church, in boy scouts (or cub scouts for RM-L), and 
they are on a competitive swim team. SM-L is also on a 
soccer team. Many friends and neighbors have provided 
glowing letters about Respondent and the boys, and attesting 
to the boys' happiness and stable environment. 62 Their 
mother has also been consistently employed since March 
2011 and appears to be financially stable. 63 They boys both 
speak fluent English and appear to have adjusted well to 
their living situation. Given the outpouring of support for 
the boys and Respondent, both in terms of having friends 
and neighbors attend the two court hearings and in submitting 
letters to the court, the court has no question that these two 
boys are surrounded by a loving [*39] and supportive 
community and that the boys arc thriving in their current 
environment. They are indeed settled in their new 
environment. 
a. Equitable Tolling 
Petitioner argues [*40] that he is entitled to equitable tolling 
of the one-year period for the filing of his Hague petition 
and that the Article 12 defense is therefore inapplicable. 
Article 12 of the Convention requires the return of a child, 
whether or not he is "settled," if the non-abducting parent 
files his Hague petition within one year of the child's 
wrongful removal or retention. See Hague Convention, art. 
12. 
Some courts have held that equitable principles may be 
applied to toll the one-year period when circumstances 
suggest that the abducting parent took steps to conceal the 
whereabouts of the child from the parent seeking return and 
such concealment delayed the filing of the petition for 
return." See, e.g., Duarte v. Bardales, 526 F.3d 563,570 (9th 
Cir. 2008). Relying on this holding, Petitioner contends that, 
even if the court finds the boys to be "now settled," the court 
should nevertheless order their return because Respondent 
concealed the boys and because Petitioner filed his petition 
within one year of learning of their location. While the court 
agrees that Respondent concealed the boys, that such 
concealment delayed Petitioner's ability to file a petition, 
and that he filed his petition [*41] within one year after he 
finally learned of their location, the court declines to apply 
equitable tolling to the one-year mandatory return period. 
The United States Circuit Courts of Appeals are divided on 
the issue of equitable tolling in this situation. The Fifth, 
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals have found 
that equitable tolling may apply in certain circumstances, 
such as when circumstances suggest that the abducting 
parent took steps to conceal the whereabouts of the children 
and the concealment caused the petitioning parent's filing 
delay. See Dietz v. Dietz, 349 Fed. Appx. 930, 2009 WL 
3378590 (5th Cir. Oct. 20, 2009); /11 re B. Del C.S.B., 559 
F.3d at 1014; Duarte, 526 F.3d at 570 (9th Cir. 2008); 
Fumes v. Reeves, 362 F.3d 702 , 723-24 (11th Cir. 2004). 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, however, has 
concluded that equitable tolling found that it does not apply. 
See Lozano v. Alvarez, 697 F.3d 41, 51 (2nd Cir. 2012), cert. 
grallfed in part, 133 S. Ct. 2851, 186 L. Ed. 2d 907 (June 
24, 2013). The Tenth Circuit has not addressed the issue. 
Because of the split among the Circuits, the United States 
Supreme Court recently granted certiorari on the issue, and 
thus the issue will be decided within the next [*42] term. 64 
In the meantime, however, this court agrees with the Second 
Circuit and other district courts that have found that the 
purpose of the one-year mandatory return period is not to 
provide a deadline for a petitioner to assert a claim but 
rather is to put a limit on the uprooting of a settled child. As 
one district court explained, "the evident import of [Article 
12's one-year periodj is not so much to provide a potential 
plaintiff with a reasonable time to assert any claims, as a 
statute of limitations docs, hut rather to put some limit on 
61 For example. their school principal has written a glowing review of hoth hoys. stating, among other things. that "they both arc among 
the very best behaved and well-mannered students I have known in school during my 13 years as a teacher and 15 years as a public school 
administrator. They have excellent attendance, including never being tardy lo school the entire past year. and they have never required 
any attendant or behavior interventions from the school or their teachers." In addition. he stated that both "regularly arc recognized and 
receive awards in our quarterly recognition celebrations for going "above and beyond" in numerous ways. and in every way they are 
exemplary students and citizens." He also notes that "they are thriving and happy in school. and they are well on their way to being happy. 
productive. and successful citizens. I have absolutely no concerns about them or their well-being." See Docket No. 28. Ex. 2 IJ. Letter 
from School Principal. dated June 26. 2013. 
62 See Docket No. 28. Ex. 26. 
6;\ Id. 
<,-, Lo::,ano 1·. Alvarez. 133 S. Ct. 2851. 186 L. Ed. 2d 907 (June 24. 2013 ). 
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the uprooting of a settled child." Toren v. Toren, 26 F. Supp. 
2d 240, 244 (D. Mass.1998), opinion vacated on other 
grounds by Toren v. Toren, 191 F.3d 23 (1st Cir.1999); see 
also Perez-Vera Report 'II l 07. 
The district court in Lozano found that, unlike a statute of 
limitations prohibiting a parent from filing a return petition 
after a year has expired, the "settled" defense merely 
permits courts to consider the interests of a child who has 
been in a new environment for more than a year before 
ordering that child to be returned to her country of habitual 
residency. See Lozano, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 227-28 
[*43] (reasoning that the one-year period in Article 12 is not 
analogous to a statute of limitations); see also Aranda v. 
Serna, 911 F. Supp. 2d 601,613 (M.D. Tenn. 2013) (finding 
the reasoning of the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits 
unpersuasive and agreeing with Second Circuit that equitable 
tolling docs not apply to equitably toll the one-year period 
based on concealment); Yaman v. Yaman, 919 F. Supp. 2d 
189, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10960, 2013 WL 322204 (D. 
N.H. Jan. 28, 2013) (same); Matovski v. Matovski, 2007 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65519, 2007 WL 2600862, at *12 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2007) (concluding that one-year period 
is not analogous to a statute of limitations); Anderson v. 
Acree, 250 F. Supp. 2d 872, 875 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (same); 
Toren v. Toren, 26 F. Supp. 2d 240, 244 (D. Mass.1998) 
(same), vacated on other grounds, 191 F.3d 23 (1st Cir. I 999). 
Even the Ninth Circuit, while still applying equitable 
tolling, recognized that "[t]he rationale behind Article 12's 
"now settled" defense is that when a child has become 
settled and adjusted in his new environment, a forced return 
might only serve to cause him further distress and accentuate 
the harm caused by the wrongful relocation." In re B. Del C. 
S. B., 559 F.3d 999, 1003 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Beaumont 
& McEleavy, [*44] The Hague Convention on International 
Child Abduction 203 ( 1999)). 
The Second Circuit, in a well-researched and well-reasoned 
opinion, rejected the petitioner's argument on appeal that 
the district court should have equitably tolled the one-year 
filing period until the date he reasonably could determine 
that his daughter had been removed from the United 
Kingdom and taken to the United States. Lozano, 697 F.3d 
at 50-51. The Second Circuit recognized that: 
While the text of the Convention does not explicitly 
address the issue, we note that the text does provide one 
clue that tolling was not anticipated. The language of 
Article 12 expressly starts the running of the one-year 
period "from the date of the wrongful removal or 
retention." It would have been a simple matter, if the 
state parties to the Convention wished to take account 
of the possibility that an abducting parent might make 
it difficult for the petitioning parent to discover the 
child's whereabouts, to run the period "from the date 
that the petitioning parent learned [or, could reasonably 
have learned] of the child's whereabouts." But the 
drafters did not adopt such language .... [T]he drafting 
history demonstrates that this [*45] was a conscious 
choice, and that the drafters specifically rejected a 
proposal to have a different date trigger the start of the 
one-year period when the child's whereabouts had been 
concealed. 
Lozano v. Alvarez, 697 F.3d 41, 51 n. 8 (2nd Cir. 2012) 
(internal citations omitted). The Lozano court also found 
that this interpretation of Article 12 "is further bolstered by 
Article 18, which provides that none of the provisions in the 
Convention "limit the power of a judicial or administrative 
authority to order the return of the child at any time." 
Lozano, 697 F.3d at 52 n. l O (citing Convention, art. 18). 
Moreover, the Lozano court also relied on the Perez-Vera 
Report 65 and concluded that: 
Simply put, the Convention is not intended to promote 
the return of a child to his or her country of habitual 
residency irrespective of that child's best interests; 
rather, the Convention embodies the judgment that in 
most instances, a child's welfare is best served by a 
prompt return to that country. The signatory states, 
however, were aware that there are situations where 
"the removal of the child can ... be justified by objective 
reasons which have to do either with [the child's] 
person, or with the [*46J environment with which [the 
child] is most closely connected." Perez-Vera Report 
at 432 (l[ 25. Accordingly, the Convention "recognizes 
the need for certain exceptions" to the signatory states' 
"general obligation[] ... to secure the prompt return of 
children who have been unlawfully removed or 
retained." Id. Perez-Vera describes these "exceptions" 
,,:-; As noted by the Second Circuit. Elisa Perez-Vera was "the official Hague Conference reporter for the Convention." Lo~ano. 697 
F.3d at 52 n. I I (quoting Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis. 51 Fed. Reg. at I 0.503). "Her 
explanatory report !was[ recognized by the Conference as the official history and commentary f*47] on the Convention." id .. and we 
have previously held that "it is an authoritative source for interpreting the Convention's provisions." id. (citing Cm//, .. Croll. 229 F.3d 
133. 137 n. 3 (2d Cir.2000)) (citation omitted). abroga!ed 011 orher grounds by Abbo/1. 560 U.S. I. 130 S. Ct. 1983. 176 L. Ed. 2d 789: 
see also Giller. 396 F.3d at 129 & n. 4. 
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as "concrete illustrations of the overly vague principle 
whereby the interests of the child are stated to be the 
guiding criterion in this area." 
Id. at 53-54; see also Blondin v. DuBois, 238 F.3d 153, 164 
(2nd Cir. 2001) (" Blondin II") (noting that the Convention's 
drafters recognized that, despite the general aim of 
"ensur[ing] the return of abducted children." there "could 
come a point at which a child would become so settled in a 
new environment that repatriation might not be in its best 
interest."). 
protect children from the harmful effects of wrongful 
removal-but must also carefully determine [*49) that the 
particular child "'has obtained an age and degree of maturity 
at which it is appropriate to take account of its views.'" 
8/011di11 ,,. Dubois, 189 F.3d 240. 247 (2d Cir.1999) (quoting 
Convention. art. 13). The Convention contains no age limit 
for applying the exception. Blo11di11 II, 238 F.3d at 167; 
Raijmakers-Eghaghe v. Haro, 131 F. Supp. 2d 953, 957 (E. 
D. Mich.2001 ). 
In this case, SM-Lis twelve-years old and will start seventh 
grade next month. RM-L will be ten-years old in three 
In sum, the Second Circuit determined that the Convention's months and will soon start fourth grade. The court had the 
drafting history "strongly supports the position that the 
one-year period in Article 12 was designed to allow courts 
to take into account a chikJ's interest in re,naining in the 
country to which he has been abducted after a certain 
amount of time has passed." 697 F.3d at 54. The court 
opportunity to observe the demeanor and maturity of both 
children during the court's in camera interview of each of 
them. Undoubtedly the task of meeting alone with a federal 
judge and his staff. with no parents or attorneys present, was 
a daunting one, but both boys faced the situation 
concluded that, [ijf this understanding of the second courageously. They both demonstrated a high level of 
paragraph of Article 12 is correct. allowing equitable tolling 
of the one-year period would undermine its purpose. A child 
may develop an interest in remaining in a country in which 
she has lived for a substantial amount of time regardless of 
her parents' efforts to conceal or locate her." See Lo-:,a110, 
697 F.3d at 54. This court agrees. 
While the court acknowledges that it may seem unfair and 
inequitable to Petitioner that the Respondent has essentially 
been "rewarded" for successfully [*48) hiding her children, 
the alternative determination-to uproot these two boys 
after they have become so well settled in their new 
maturity in answering the court's questions-answering the 
questions in an articulate, thoughtful, and respectful manner. 
They arc both good students with strong academic records. 
They both expressed a strong desire to remain in Utah and 
had particular objections to returning to Mexico. They 
confirmed that [*50] they enjoy going to school here. they 
arc involved in church and several sports activities, and they 
have many friends here. Indeed, both boys became visibly 
distraught when the court discussed the court's task of 
evaluating whether they should be returned to Mexico. The 
response of both boys appeared to be purely genuine-not 
concocted or rehearsed in any way. Additionally. the boys 
environment in which they have spent the past two and were adamant about not wanting to have a supervised visit 
one-half years-seems even more reprehensible and contrary their father while he was in town for the instant court 
to the ultimate purpose of the Hague Convention. Thus, the proceeding. 
court declines to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling to 
the Article 12 "well-settled" defense. Accordingly. the court finds, by a preponderance of the 
iv. The Article 13 "Age and Maturity" Exception 
The Hague Convention provides that "[ tlhc judicial or 
administrative authority [considering a petition! may also 
refuse to order the return of the child if it finds that the child 
objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree 
of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its 
views." Hague Convention, art. 13. The age and maturity 
exception is to be narrowly construed and must he shown by 
a preponderance of the evidence. England r. England. 234 
F.3d 268. 272 (5th Cir.2000) (citing §§ 1160 I (a)( 4 ). 
11603( e)(2 )( A)). 
In applying the "age and maturity" exception. a court must 
not focus solely on the general goal of the Convention-to 
evidence. that the boys arc of an appropriate age and 
maturity such that it is appropriate for the court to take into 
account their desire to not return to Mexico. 
If a court determines. however, that the youngster's opinion 
is the product of undue influence. the child's wishes arc not 
taken into account. Desilw1. 481 F.3d at 1286. Herc. the 
court recognizes that the hoys have spent the past two years 
solely with their mother and maternal grandmother. and that 
this circumstance has undoubtedly had an impact on their 
desire to stay with their mother in Utah. It is also possible 
that their mother has negatively colored the hoys' 1*511 view 
of their father. Herc. while the children's objections to 
returning to Mexico could he due to the mother's possible 
undue influence over them. the court finds that this possible 
undue influence is not the only reason the children desire 
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not to return to Mexico, and thus. the court declines to 
ignore their wishes. The children appear to be genuinely 
happy and thriving in their current situation. The court has 
attempted to balance this possible undue influence against 
other reasons the boys desire to stay here and concludes that 
even though the mother has perhaps exerted some undue 
influence on the boys, the court should still take into 
that Petitioner cannot exercise his visitation rights with his 
children. It merely establishes that the boys will not be 
returned to Mexico but will remain in Utah for any custody 
proceedings that are initiated here. In light of the pending 
Extradition proceedings against Respondent, however, the 
future remains uncertain for this family. 
account the children· s wishes to remain in Utah and not be V. CONCLUSION 
returned to Mexico. For this independent reason, the court 
declines to return them to Mexico. For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that 
the Petition for Immediate Return of Children to Petitioner 
The court's decision in this case is not based in any way on 
a belief that the courts of Utah will do a better job than the 
courts of Mexico City in addressing this unfortunate custody 
situation. To the contrary, the court is certain that the courts 
of Mexico City would be fully capable of handling this 
litigation. In addition. the court has no doubt that Petitioner 
genuinely wants to sec his children [*52) and have a 
relationship with them. and the court hopes such a 
relationship can develop in the future. The court, however, 
is convinced that the return of these children to Mexico City 
Pursuant to the Hague Convention and the International 
Child Abduction Remedies Act is DENIED. The Clerk of 
the Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of 
Respondent. 
DATED this 5th day of August, 20 I 3. 
BY THE COURT: 
Isl Dale A. Kimball 
at this time and under these circumstances-however DALE A. KIMBALL 
wrongfully the circumstances have arisen-would severely 
traumatize these children. The court emphasizes that this United States District Judge 
decision has a limited purpose and effect. It does not mean 
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JUAN PABLO MATAS-VIDAL, 
Respondent. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL FOR LACK OF 
JURISDICTION 
CASE No. 134100249 
JUDGE CHRISTINE JoHNSON 
CoMM1ss10NER THOMAS PATTON 
THIS MATTER came before the Court on October 20, 2014, for hearing on the 
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. Respondent Juan Pablo Matas-Vidal 
("Father") was not present, but was represented by counsel of record, David S. Dolowitz and 
Shane A. Marx of the Jaw firm Dowwrrz HuNN1cun, PLLC. Petition Brooke Robinson, a.k.a. 
Susan Consuelo Libbey-Aguilera ("Mother"), was not present, but was represented by counsel of 
-1 ,...,, n 
record, Don R. Petersen of the law firn1 HowARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C .. Having received the 
parties' pleadings and heard their respective arguments, upon the basis of record herein and for 
good cause otherwise appearing, THE COURT HEREBY FINDS, CONCLUDES, AND 
ORDERS, as follows: 
I. Mother's oral motion to continue the hearing is DENIED. 
2. All motions in domestic cases come before commissioners pursuant to URCP 
IO 1, and the deadlines therein govern the timeliness of the parties' pleadings. Contrary to 
Mother's assertions, the deadlines of URCP 7 do not apply at this stage of proceedings. Father's 
reply was timely filed under URCP IO I. Moreover, Mother's absence due to her recent 
incarceration does not warrant a continuance. The issue of jurisdiction is a matter of law, and 
Mother's presence is not necessary for the Court's determination on the matter. 
3. Father's Motion to Dismiss for Lack ofJurisdiction is GRANTED. 
4. The Court is concerned by the suggestion of the federal court in the proceedings it 
conducted with respect to this family under the Hague Convention and the International Child 
Abduction Remedies Act that "the boys will not be returned to Mexico but will remain in Utah 
for any custody proceedings initiated here." Matas-Vidal v. Libbey-Aguilera, No. 
2:13CV422DAK, 2013 U.S. Dist. Lexis 110630 at *52 (D. Utah Aug. 5, 2013). 
5. A federal court cannot confer jurisdiction on Utah to conduct child custody 
proceedings and a federal district court judge cannot determine what jurisdiction Utah has or can 
maintain. Only Utah state-court judges can make a binding detem1ination of their own 
jurisdiction. 
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6. Utah's jurisdiction for custody proceedings is determined by the Utah Uniform 
Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act ("UCCJEA 11 ), Utah Code §§ 78B-13-101 et. 
seq. 
7. The doctrine of res judicata does not apply to the federal court's suggestion that 
this Court has jurisdiction to conduct child custody proceedings, and the federal court's statement 
is that regard is not binding on this Court. This Court's jurisdiction pursuant to the UCCJEA was 
not an issue, was not litigated, and was not adjudicated in the proceedings held by federal court. 
The federal court's stated assumption that this Court had jurisdiction is not entitled to any 
deference. 
8. The federal court's ruling is valid except to the extent that it implies this Court has 
jurisdiction to conduct child custody proceedings. 
9. The Court finds that Mexico had jurisdiction in October 2007 when child custody 
proceedings were initiated in the 36th Court of Family Matters in the Federal District of Mexico 
in case number 1427/2007 and that the subsequent bifurcation in the 24th Court of Family 
Matters in the Federal District of Mexico in case number 1529/2010 further confirmed that 
jurisdiction and reserved the parties custodial rights as subject to further litigation therein in 
November 2010. 
10. Mexico reserved the right to enter additional order regarding the custody of these 
children, and no Mexico court has vacated that order or otherwise unreserved the right to 
conclude custody proceedings there. 
1 1. The fact that Mother thereafter fled the jurisdiction-even if she believed she was 
3 
authorized to do so-does not change the fact that there were pending child custody proceedings 
in Mexico at the time. 
12. Mexico had child custody jurisdiction. It had jurisdiction over both parties, it had 
home-state jurisdiction over the children, and it had jurisdiction of the child custody action 
pending before it. Such jurisdiction is continuing and exclusive in nature. Mexico never gave up 
or abandoned it jurisdiction over its prior orders or the various proceedings that remain pending 
there. 
13. Pursuant to Utah Code § 788-13-105( I), "A court of this state shall treat a foreign 
country as a state of the United States for purposes of applying [the UCCJEA]." The Court does 
not find that this case is significantly different than if this was a New York case. If this happened 
in New York and temporary orders were entered there, and then, for whatever reason, one of the 
parents left the State of New York and the courts of New York delayed proceeding on custody 
issues because that party had absconded, but the New York courts otherwise reserved the right to 
enter additional orders and reserved its jurisdiction until the absconding party could be found, 
there is no basis to assume that New York had given up or otherwise abandoned its jurisdiction. 
14. In such a case, the New York court is perfectly within its discretion to delay 
proceedings or enforcement of existing orders until the absconding party reappears before it. The 
fact that the party may have absconded to Utah from New York and stayed here, regardless of 
how long, does not change the continuing and exclusive nature of New York's jurisdiction over 
any child custody proceedings. 
15. Pursuant to Utah Code ~ 78B-13-206( 1 ), "a court of this state may not exercise its 
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jurisdiction ... at the time of the commencement of the proceeding a proceeding concerning the 
custody of the child had been previously commenced in a court of another state having 
jurisdiction substantially in conformity with [the UCCJEA]." If Mother wants to address the 
parties' custodial rights with regard to these children, her remedy is to return to Mexico and 
participate in the child custody proceedings pending there. 
16. If Mother desires to modify the parties existing custodial rights, as articulated in 
the orders from Mexico, she must seek such modification in the courts of Mexico. "[A] court of 
this state may not modify a child custody determination made by a court of another state unless 
... neither the child, nor a parent, nor any person acting as a parent presently resides in the other 
state." Utah Code § 78B-13-203(2). Father continues to reside in Mexico, and the courts there 
retain continuing exclusive jurisdiction over modification of their orders. 
17. The Court would certainly never find that judges or commissioners in Utah are 
smarter than judges or commissioners in New York. But that is exactly what Mother is asking 
this Court to do. Mother is asking the Court to declare that because we are dealing with Mexico, 
that the courts there do not have exclusive ongoing jurisdiction. This Court is not willing to rule 
that it is smarter or better than the judges and courts in Mexico, which routinely deal with 
Mexican issues, Mexican children, and a Mexican divorces. 1 t appears to this Court, in every 
way, shape, and form that Mexico has never given up its ongoing exclusive jurisdiction. 
Therefore, this Court must recognize Mexico's ongoing exclusive jurisdiction over custody 
proceedings and orders with respect to these children. 
18. Additionally, criminal charges of Child Trafficking have been pending against 
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Mother in the Thirteenth District Court of Federal Penal Process for the Federal District in case 
number 85/20 I 2, since she fled Mexico with the children. Mother fails to acknowledge that the 
criminal case for Child Trafficking is a further exercise and manifestation of Mexico's continuing 
exclusive jurisdiction to conduct custody proceedings under the UCCJEA, and therefore this 
Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain simultaneous proceedings until such criminal charges are 
resolved, pursuant to Utah Code § 788-13-206. 
19. If convicted of the pending criminal charges in Mexico, Mother's parental rights 
will be terminated. The UCCJEA defines "child custody proceeding" to include any proceedings 
in which "termination of parental rights" is at issue. Id. § 788-13-102( 4 ). Furthermore, the 
determination of Mother's legal and physical custody rights over the parties' minor children and 
the extent to which her actions were justified are at the very heart of the Child Trafficking 
criminal case. Under the UCCJEA, these are all child custody determination reached through 
child custody proceedings. See also, In re Baby E.Z., 2011 UT 38, ~ii 16-17 ( defining "custody 
proceeding" under UCCJEA's federal parallel, the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, as 
broadly including any proceeding regarding "actual possession and control of a child" or that 
"divests a natural parent of all parental rights, including the rights of custody"). This Court 
cannot exercise its jurisdiction to create a new legal defense for Mother or to otherwise allow her 
to evade the judicial processes in Mexico that she seeks to avoid. Consequently, Utah lacks the 
authority to conduct simultaneous child custody proceedings until-at the very least-Mother's 
Child Trafficking criminal charges are resolved. 
20. Moreover, Mother's actions have eliminated any claim that this situation warrants 
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the exercise of emergency jurisdiction under Utah Code § 78B- 13-204. Under subsection 204(3 ), 
this Court's exercise of any emergency jurisdiction is limited, and "any order issued by a court of 
this state under this section shall specify in the order a period of time which the court considers 
adequate to allow the person seeking an order to obtain an order from the state having 
jurisdiction." Further, "[t]he order issued in this state remains in effect until an order is obtained 
from the other state within the period specified or the period expires." Id. § 78B-13-204(3 ). This 
Court likely would have exercised such jurisdiction to allow Mother to return to Mexico to 
address the orders and proceedings pending there. However, this action was filed on November 
18, 2013. We are now I I months down the road, and more than a year past the time when the 
federal court made its order. There no longer exists any basis for the exercise of emergency 
jurisdiction. We are well past that point, and the Court cannot excuse the fact that Mother has not 
returned to the Court of original ongoing jurisdiction and addressed the pending proceedings or 
otherwise obtained a new order there. 
21. Alternatively, even if this Court had a basis to exercise jurisdiction it declines to 
do so as a result of Mother's unjustifiable conduct. Pursuant to Utah Code § 78B-13-208(1 ), "if a 
court of this state has jurisdiction under this chapter because a person invoking the jurisdiction 
has engaged in unjustifiable conduct, the court shall decline to exercise its jurisdiction." It is 
uncontested that Mother fled the tenitorial jurisdiction of Mexico when proceedings and orders 
were still pending there, and that she has refused to return or otherwise engage in the judicial 
process there. This Court will not condone or otherwise overlook Mother's apparent attempts to 
evade and her unwillingness to engage in the judicial processes in Mexico. Even if there were 
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some arguable basis for jurisdiction herein, the Court will neither exercise emergency nor 
general child custody jurisdiction over these children because Mother has made every effort to 
avoid the jurisdiction of the courts in Mexico, and frustrated the ability of the courts of Mexico 
to conclude the custody proceedings there. In essence, Mother has engaged in unjustifiable 
conduct, and she asks this Court to exercise jurisdiction over issues she has refused to address, 
but that she could have and should have pursued and concluded in Mexico months ago. 
This Order is signed and entered when e/ectro11ically stamped and dated 
by the Court at the top of the first page. 
Approved as to form: 
Date: ____________ _ 
Don R. Petersen 
Allorneyfor Petitioner 
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RULE 7(0 NOTICE 
Pursuant to Rule 7(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, I hereby certify that a true 
and correct copy of the above form of Order of Dismissal.for Lack of Jurisdiction was served on 
November 10, 2014, by the means and to the parties indicated in the following Certificate of 
Service. Notice of objections as to the form of this order must be submitted to the Court and 
counsel within seven (7) days after service. Should no objections to this order be submitted to 
the Court and counsel within seven (7) days after service, this form of order shall be presented to 
the Court for entry and signature. 
Isl Shane A. Marx 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on November 10, 2014 I caused the foregoing to be served, 
pursuant to UTAH R. C1v. P. 5(b), on the following person(s), by the means indicated herein. 
Don R. Petersen 
How ARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorney for Petitioner 
120 E. 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 1248 
Provo, UT 84603 
Tel: (801) 373-6345 
Fax: (801) 377-4991 
Email: petersend@provolawyers.com 
n ..... ,.,. ..... h ....... nr:: ">n'1 A no.ca /\ 11 A 
___ U.S. Regular Mail 
___ Hand Delivery 
___ Facsimile Transmission 
___ E-Mail 
--'---X _____ E-Filing 
Isl Shane A. Marx 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT, UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
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JUAN PABLO MATAS-VIDAL, 
Respondent. 
ORDER OVERRULING PETITIONER'S 
OBJECTION TO COMMISSIONER'S 
RECOMMENDATION 
C.\sE No. 134100249 
]t.;DGE CHRISTINE JoHNSON 
Co:-.1:-.uss101'ER THOMAS P ATT01' 
THIS MATTER came before the Honorable Christine Johnson on March 5, 2015 for 
hearing on Petitioner's O~jection to Commissioner's Recommendation Re: Respondent's Motion 
to Dismiss for Lake of Jurisdiction (Hearing October 20, 2014), filed on November 3, 2014 
pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure I 08. Petitioner Brooke Robinson, also known as Susan 
Consuelo Libbey-Aguilera, was present and represented by counsel of record, Don R. Petersen of 
1\,1,..,.,-,h -17 0f\"1C f'l-1,")f'I nl\i1 
the law firm Howard, Lewis & Petersen, PC. Respondent Juan Pablo Matas-Vidal was not 
present, but was represented by counsel of record, David S. Dolowitz and Shane A. Marx of the 
law firm Dolowitz Hunnicutt, PLLC. Having heard argument, upon the basis of record herein, 
and for good cause otherwise appearing, THE COURT HEREBY FINDS, CONCLUDES, 
AND ORDERS THAT: 
1. Petitioner's objection to the Commissioner's recommendation, announced after 
hearing on October 20, 2014, and Order of Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction, entered on 
December 5, 2014, is OVERRULED or otherwise DENIED. 
2. The Commissioner's recommendation contained in the Order of Dismissal for 
Lack of Jurisdiction, entered on December 5, 2014, is accurate and appropriate, and the Court 
hereby adopts the analysis contained therein. 
3. There are both civil and criminal proceedings pending in Mexico wherein the 
custody of the parties' minor children and the parties' parental rights remain at issue. This 
indicates to the Court that Mexico has not abandoned and otherwise continues to exercise 
jurisdiction over issues of child custody. Consequently, this Court is without and otherwise 
declines to assert child custody jurisdiction. This determination is informed by the Court's 
reading of the Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act, Utah Code §§ 78B-
l 3-101 et seq., the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C.A. * 1738A, and 
Crump v. Crump, 821 P.2d 1172 (Utah Ct. App. 1991 ). 








Support and Alimony, Entry of Restraining Order, and.for Attorney Fees, filed on November I 8, 
2013 by Petitioner Brooke Robinson, also known as Susan Consuelo Libbey-Aguilera, is hereby 
DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. 
This Order is sig11ed a11d e11tered whe11 electro11ical/y stamped and dated by the 
Court at the top of the first page. 
Approved as to form: 
Date: ___________ _ 
Don R. Petersen 
Attorney.for Petitioner 
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RULE 7(0 NOTICE 
Pursuant to Rule 7(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, I hereby certify that a true 
and correct copy of the above form of order was served on March 6, 2015, by the means and to 
the parties indicated in the following Certificate of Service. Notice of objections as to the form 
of this order must be submitted to the Court and counsel within seven (7) days after service. 
Should no objections to this order be submitted to the Court and counsel within seven (7) days 
after service, this form of order shall be presented to the Court for entry and signature. 
Isl Shane A. Marx 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on March 6, 2015, I caused the foregoing to be served, 
pursuant to UTAH R. Ov. P. 5(b ), on the following person(s), by the means indicated herein. 
Don R. Petersen 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEJ\, PC 
Attorney for Petitioner 
120 E. 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 1248 
Provo, UT 84603 
Tel: (801) 373-6345 
Fax: (801) 377-4991 
Email: pctcrsend@provolawyers.com 
l\/1,..,,.,..h '17 ')()-'IC l"\'1,')I"\ Dll/1 
___ U.S. Regular Mail 
___ Hand Delivery 
___ Facsimile Transmission 
--=-X-"--_ E-Mail 
--=-X-"--_ E-Fi Ii ng 
Isl Shane A. Marx 
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FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 




JUAN PABLO MATAS-VIDAL, 
Respondent. 
RULING AND ORDER ON 
PETITIONER'S MOTION TO 
AMEND ORDER 
Case No. 134100249 
Date: April 28, 2015 
Judge Christine S. Johnson 
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner's Motion to Amend, filed 
together with a supporting memorandum on March 31, 2015. Respondent filed 
his Opposition on April 14, 2015. There was no reply. Neither party having 
requested a hearing, Respondent submitted the motion for decision on April 22, 
2015. Having reviewed the submissions of the parties, and being advised of the 
applicable rules and the governing law, the Court denies the motion, based 
upon the following: 
The Court entered its Order Overruling Objection to Commissioner's 
Recommendation on March 17, 2015. Petitioner filed her present motion within 
14 days, as required. Petitioner seeks relief pursuant to Rule 59, which allows 
for an amendment to judgment under specified grounds: to correct irregularity 
in the proceedings, misconduct by the jury, accident or surprise, newly 
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discovered evidence, excessive or inadequate damages, insufficiency of the 
evidence, or error. See URCP 59(a). Additionally, Petitioner cites to Rule 52, 
which permits the court to "amend its findings or make additional findings and 
may amend the judgment accordingly." URCP 52{b). A decision to alter or 
amend judgment lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. See College 
Irr. Co. v. Logan River & Blacksmith Fork Irr. Co., 780 P.2d 1241, 1245 (Utah 1989). 
In Petitioner's memorandum, she devotes significant time to restating 
facts which have been previously presented. She then argues that the Court 
should amend its prior judgment, relying upon prior error as grounds for 
amending judgment under Rule 59. However, the arguments asserted are not 
new and are no more persuasive now then they were when presented initially. 
Because Petitioner's objection to the Commissioner and this Court's decision 
regarding jurisdiction has been fully heard and considered, this Court declines 
to exercise its discretion to amend judgment under Rule 59. 
Based upon the foregoing, Petitioner's motion to amend judgment is 
DENIED. 
SO ORDERED. 
This Ruling shall stand as the Order of the Court. Pursuant to Rule 7, no 
further order is required. 
DATED this 2fJ day of April, 2015. 
BY THE COURT: 
certificate of mailing is on the following page. 
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I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following 
people for case 134100249 by the method and on the date specified. 
EMAIL: DAVID s DOLOWITZ sandy@dolowitzhunnicutt.com 
EMAIL: JAMES M HUNNICUTT jim@dolowitzhunnicutt.com 
EMAIL: SHANE A MARX shane@dolowitzhunnicutt.com 
EMAIL: DON R PETERSEN petersend@provolawyers.com 
04/30/2015 /s/ LEISHA MEDINA 
Date: 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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AddendumE 
Order Dated 2/8/2013 Dismissing Main 
Action in Mexico and Rescinding Prior 
Orders 
r' 
SUPERIOR SUPeAIOR COURT OF JUSTIC! OF M FEDERAL DlSTRICf 
. (@ 
COURT (ILLEGlBLE) 
OF JUSTICE (IUIGIBU?J 
OF THE FEDERAL DISTRICT TlflRTY•Snmt OF TH! FAMIUAR 
~ 
Mexico, Federal District the ef1ht of February of two thousand thirteen. 
(.ii} 
Gfven new account In the present case, and ta kins Into conslderatlon that Justice must be prompt 
and expeditious, and tn order to comply fully with the prtnclple of congruence that must preval\ 
with the Judicial charges, In the sense that once you notice any involuntary error, you must be 
corrected, to not prevail In the same, so that In such tessltura and In response to that of records of 
(@ the case warns, that Mr. JUAN PABLO MATAS VIDAL through wrftlng submitted the eleven of 
October In the year two thousand and seven, In the Oflclalla Common Clvll-Famlllar , sued SUSAN 
CONSUELO LIBBEY AGUILERA In the ordinary dvfl route, as main action the necessary divorce as 
well as various benefits notwithstanding the foregoing, Mr. JUAN PABLO MATAS VIDAL, again 
f"' 
Instituted divorce uncaused proceedings against SUSAN CONSUELO LIBBEY AGUILERA which 
@ settled under the number 1529/2010, In the Familiar Court Twenty.fourth In this H. Court, 
according to/and consists of the certified copies that were sent by the holder of the said Court of 
which even ln addition warns that on the hearing dated twenty-fifth day of November of the year 
two thousand ten, was Issued the resolution that proceeded In accordance with the law, In which 
ft dissolved the marriage bond and In addition they were separated except their rfghts to that In 
@ the corresponding life lncldental to assert what appropriate to Its right In relation to the proposal 
and counter proposal of convention, so In that vein and In response to that as It was pointed out In 
previous ffnes the main action of the trfal that we are dealing with It was the necessary divorce, so 
that when being demonstrated that such action was exercised by the same plaintiff and even 
executed by diverse Judge, because It does not have to pass unnoticed that the sworn statement 
~ of marriage that work In performances (Page 435) comprises the relevant entry to the dlssolut1on 
of the marriage bond In which case we have to the object of his action was precrsely to dissolve 
the marriage bond that unites them, Therefore It Is left WITHOUT EFFECTS EACH AND EVERY ONE 
OF THE PROVISIONAl MEASURES ordered during the aftermath procedural, such as 
GUARDIANSHIP AND PROVISIONAL CUSTODY of the minor SANTIAGO and RODRIGO surname 
~ MATAS-UBBEY ln favor of SUSAN CONSUELO LIBBEY AGUILERA; as well as the PROVISIONAL 
AUMONY decreed In favor of SUSAN CONSUELO LIBBEY AGUILERA and minors SANTIAGO and 
RODRIGO surname MATAS-LIBBEY In charge of JUAN PABLO MATAS VIDAL; the REGIME OF 
PROVISIONAL VISITS In favor of JUAN PABLO MATAS VIDAL with their minor children SANTIAGO 
~ and RODRIGO surname MATAS -LIBBEY; and the use of.the family home In favor of Mrs. SUSAN @ CONSUELO UBBEY AGUILERA and Its above mentioned minor children, which were decreed In an 
' 
Interlocutory Judgment the fourteenth day of December of two thousand seven, as amended In 
the Judgment of the seventh of May of two thousand eight, By the H Third Family Room of this H. 
Court, as well as the diverse variation dated twenty-two of October two thousand efght, carried 
out by the same authority In compllance with the Judgment pronounced by the Judge of the ninth 
district In Civil Matters In the Federal District. 
However, with the understanding that such prlvlleges wlll be able to be asserted In the track and 
in right way to proceed before the competent authority to d~ so, ~nd before the appropriate c. 
Judge, with the understanding that at any time you must safeguard the best Interests of their 
minor children, any time that In accordance with the provisions of article 4 Constitutional 
Convention of the rlgnts of the Child, the Law for the Protection of Chlldren and Adolescents, and 
the Law of the rights of children, the ~hlldren have the right to a family llfe In harmony, to be loved 
and respected by their parents and to a healthy co-existence with both, especially since that Is 
where It should be the preferred application of the law, understood by preference the 
circumstance that exalts the Interest of children above all else, and given the Importance of the 
interests that save this type of subjective right, that Is precisely the relatlonshlp between parents 
and children, generator of reciprocal rights and duties, always conceived of the protection In 
function of the children, subjective right that has the features to be a duty an obHgatl(?n which 
could not be excused and the same must be done personally, because It represents a positive duty 
to continued treatment which requires a constant and effective deployment of a conduct which 
has the responsiblllty to the parental authority, where the parents have an obligation to ensure 
their chlldren and keep them In your company, support them, educate them and give them an 
integral formation as parental authority, Involves not only rights, but also duties on all the Interest 
and the protection of minors, thus, ft Is necessary to mention the Decree (llleglble) on the right of 
the chlld, publlshed In the Official Journal of the Federation on the twenty-fifth day of January one 
thousand nine hundred and ninety-one, that of any (lllegl~le) signed expected to arrive to 
understand both sides, as sound people that are and can analyze taking awareness, of the harm It 
is causing their minor children, emphasizing that the "family" as the fundamental group of the 
society and the natural environment for the growth and welfare of all Its members and In 
partfcular their children should receive the necessary protection and assistance to fully assume Its 
responstbllltles within the community, recognizing also that the child for the full and harmonious 
development of his personality must grow up In a family environment In an atmosphere of 
happiness, love and understanding and conslder1ng that the child should be fully prepared for an 
Independent llfe In society and be educated In the spirit of the Ideals" ... also bearing in mind that 
as indicated In the Declaration of the Rights of the Child the child by Its lack of physical and mental 
maturity you need special attention and care, Including appropriate legal protection, both before 
and after birth Is agreed at the above Convention situations that come precisely to protect the 
best Interests of the children In the must lie the preferential appllcatlon of the law, convention In 
which a chfld means every human being below the age of eighteen years of age according to deals 
with the artfcle 1, It also emerges that the numeral following the rights set forth In the Convention 
In question 1ts application to ensure each chlld subject to their Jurf sdlction, without distinction, 
regardless of race, color, sex, language, rellglon, polltlcal or other opinion, national, ethnic or 
® 
socfal origin, economic position, physical Impediments, the birth or any other condition of the 
chlld, his/her parents or legal representatives taking states parties all appropriate measures to 
ensure the protect1on of the chlld, asalnst any form of discrimination or punishment for cause of 
the condition, activities, the opinions expressed or bellefs of their parents, guardians or famlly 
members, and thus a series of artldes whose content eminently search for all llghts and without a 
doubt safeguard the development of children In their physlcal aspects, mental and emotional In a 
harmonious way and Integral, but the most Important thing Is It fs precisely within the entire body 
of rights that the less you corresponds, Is established In artlde 12 and 13 of the Convention 
already cited above. 
By virtue of the foregoing, the occupied the documents exhibited upon reason that bv its receipt 
thereof In the facts and In Jts opportunity flied the present case, as total and deffnltlvely dosed. 
And In compliance with the circular 23/2010 of the twenty-three of March of this year and general 
arrangements 10-07/2005, 31-35/2009 and 5-32/20009 Issued by the Plenary Session of the 
Council of the Judiciary of the Federal District and In terms of article 28 of the Regulation of the 
Institutional system of flies of the Superior Court of Justice and the Council of the Judiciary of the 
Federal Dlstrf ct; ft Is also brought to the attention of the parties that this dossier and documents 
that are In the same and which have been exhibited as a basis the action and as evidence are 
susceptible to destruction; the above once the end of this procedure by which the parties must go 
to this Court to request the return of their documents within the tenn of SIX MONTHS from that 
takes effect this provided, leaving because of their receipt. Please contact the above to the parties 
and to interested parties by judlclal Bullettn In terms of article 114 last part of the Code of Clv11 
Procedure. NOTIFlm. As well as provided and sl1nlng the C Judge thirty-sixth of the Family, Mr. 
JORGE RODRIGUEZ MURILLO assisted by the Secretariat of Agreements 11B" Martha Mellda 
Rodriguez Mendoza that authorizes and attests to whet ocurred. 
./ 
Translator Certification 
lune 24, 2013 
-· 
Elizabeth M Robles 
Provo UT 84601 
nzmrobles@gmall.com 
To Whom It May Concern: 
This certificate hereby verifies that the accompanying translation has been prepared by 
a certified translator. I, Ellzabeth M Robles, am the Certlfted Translator. I am fluent ln 
both English and Spanish and I certify that the English language translation of the 
attached document Is a true and correct translation of the Spanish language portion of 
the document. This certificate Is signed attesting to the translation having been 
undertaken with quality and attention. It accurately represents the meaning of the 
source text, to the best of my ablllty. 
~-
Printed Name: Ellzabe h M Robles 
@ 
Translator Certification 
June 24, 2013 
Elizabeth M Robles 
Provo UT 84601 
11zmrobles@gma11,com 
To Whom It May Concern: 
This certificate hereby verlfles that the accompanying translation has been prepared by 
a certified translator. I, Elizabeth M Robles, am the Certified Translator. I am fluent in 
both English and Spanish and I certify that the English language translation of the 
attached document Is a true and correct translation of the Spanish language portion of 
the document. This certificate Is signed attesting to the translatlon having been 
undertaken with quallty and attention. It accurately represents the meaning of the 
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At left margin appear two (2) rubber seals r ding: 
Superior Court of Justice for the Federal Di t ·ct - Mexico 
The United Mexican States (National Embt ) 
.Domestic Affairs Thirty-Sixth Court 
- Electronic signature SICOR/TSJDF begin i g-lnstance: Domestic Affairs Thirty-Sixth 
Court. File: 1472/2007. Clerk: "B". Dee : resolution published on February 8, 2013. 
Signatory: JF36SB. NAS: ... (illegible text). 
- Electronic signature SICOR/TSJDF begin I g-lnstance: Domestic Affairs Thirty-Sixth 
Court. File: 1472/2007. Clerk: 11811 • Dee : resolution published on February 8, 2013. 
Signatory: JF36J. NAS: 5109-30 ... (illegible t xt). 
Mexico City, Federal District, February 08, 
With these· records, note is given again. a taking into consideration that Justice 
must be prompt and expeditious, and i rder to duly fulfill with congruence 
principle to prevail in court procedures, wi in the sense that once be noted any 
unwillingness error, it must be corrected, i order to not prevail in it; therefor.a, in 
such circumstance and attending that in ev d nee within records it is seen, that Mr. 
JUAN-PABLO MATAS--VIDAL, in brief file n October 11 2007 at Civil-Domestic 
Common Parties Clerkship, sued from S AN-CONSUELO LIBBEY-AGUILERA 
within Ordinary Proceedings, Necessary i orce as main action, as well several 
considerations; notwithstanding the forego, g, Mr. JUAN-PABLO MATA$-VIDAL, 
again brought a No-Fault Divorce v sus SUSAN-CONSUELO LIBBEY-
AGUILERA, which was established under mber 1529/2010, at Domestic Affairs 
Twenty-Fourth Court of this Honorable Cou as contained in certified copies which 
were sent to the Head of this Court! where is further noticed that at hearing held 
on November 25, 2010. it was pronounce solution that proceeded according to 
the Law, wherein there were dissolved ma age bonds and further there were left 
in safe their rights so that within corre ponding incidental means they may 
enforced whatever may correspond in his r hts related to commitment motion and 
counter-motion; therefore, in such circu s ance and attending to what is was 
mentioned in previous lines, the main sui action subject matter herein was the 
necessary divorce. by proving that such a i n was exercised by said plaintiff and_ 
further executed by another Judge, since i must not be unaware that marriage 
. affidavit which is contained at the records ( age 435), there is the corresponding 
.';}'i>.\J ~lLL~
0 
ording to marriage bonds dissolution, n such event we have that the action 
C., ~Dfl mlJ HI 11£1 ~ 
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subject matter was precisely dissolving m · 
having upheld the main action in another 
THE ACTING SUIT since even though 
considerations, we must not lose sight 
consequence of main action; therefore, th 
main action, thereto joined that this Judg 
decree or resolve related to issues that 
enforce them as autonomous rights, circ 
subsequently, he may claim as autonom 
EACH AND ALL TEMP9RARY MEAS · 
·age bonds joining them, since upon 
urt, what proceeds is to SET ASIDE 
laintiff demanded several accessory 
at said attached considerations are 
have same procedural chance than 
s legally hindered to amend litis and 
e merely accessory, he Intended to 
stance which does not hinder that, 
s rights with final kind; as a result, 
ES ARE SET WITH NO. LON.GER 
EFFECTS pronounced during procedural mplications, such as: TEMPORARY 
GUARD AND CUSTODY for minor childre ANTIAGO and RODRIGO surnamed 
MATAS-LIBBEY in favor of SUSAN-CO UELO LIBBEY~AGUILERA; as well 
TEMPORARY ALIMONY decreed in fa r of SUSAN-CONSUELO LIBBEY-
AGUILERA and for minors SANTIAG and RODRIGO surnamed MATAS-
LIBBEY in charge of JUAN-PABLO MAT -VIDAL; TEMPORARY REGIME FOR 
VISITS AND LIVING-TOGETHER in favo f JUAN.PABLO MATAS-VIDAL with 
his minors children SANTIAGO and R(?D IGO surnamed MATAS-LIBBEY; and 
USE OF FAMILY DWELLING in favor · Mrs. SUSAN-CONSUELO -LIBBEY-
AGUILERA and her mentioned children, hich were decreed on interlocutory 
judgment dated December 14. 2007, mod· i din judgment dated May 7, 2008, by 
H. Third Domestic Chamber of this H. urt, as well several variations dated 
October 22, 2008, pronounced by same thority upon fulfillment to enforceable 
judgment pronounced by Ninth District Jud for Civil Affairs at the Federal District. 
Now, with the understanding that said p~ r ative may be enforceable at means 
and manners in accordance with the La as it may proceed before competent 
authority therefore, and before Citizen Ju g as might it may correspond by shift, 
with the understanding that at any time it ould be safe kept the superior interest 
of their minor children, since in accordan with provisions contained in Article 4th 
of the Constitution, the Convention on e Rights of the Child, the Law for 
Protection of Boys, Girls, and Teenagers, d the Law on the Rights of Boys and 
Girls, children are entitled to a family life i armony, to be loved and respected by 
their parents and to a healthy living-toget r with both, maximum that is in them 
wherein it should fall preferential appl tion of the law, understanding for 
preference the circumstance in which it is xalted minors interest upon any other, 
@ ~=~and given the importance of interests whic his kind of subjective right safeguards, 
~ ~ILL~ ich it is precisely, the relationship be en parents and children. generator of 
J>1j_18 : ,.:«i'Gwrocal rights and duties. always con e ed in function of children coverage; 
i.up•,a \I•. i 
AUf PGR IL 
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subjective right which has as a characteri to be a duty and an obligation from 
which cannot be excused and the same s uld be personally performed, since it 
represents a positive duty of continuous I pse, who demands and requires an 
efficient and constant deployment of a beh ·or which should fill the patria potestas 
commitment, wherein parents are bound to I ok after their children, to have them in 
their company, to nourish them, to educat them and to procure them an integral 
fonnation, since "patria potestas11 not only i plies rights, but also duties, over all, 
interest and protection for minor childre ., therefore, it is necessary to refer to 
Enacted Decree upon Rights of the Child, ublished at the Official Gazette of the 
Federation on January 25, 1991, which in me manner, the Undersigned expects 
that both parties may understand, as think and rational parties as they are, and 
analyze it taking conscious of damage ich they are causing to their minor 
children, mainly outstanding that: "-... th amily, as society's fundamental group 
and natural means for growth and welfare all of its members and in special their 
children, should receive necessary prote tion and attendance in order to plainly 
assume their responsibility within comm n ty; also acknowledging that, for plain 
and harmonic personality development, th hild should grow within family sinus in 
a happiness, love and understanding en i nment; and taking into consideration 
that child should_ be plainly prepared for a independent life within society and be 
educated under ideals spirit, ... ;n furtherm e, having present that, as set forth in 
the Statement on the Rights of the Child, t e child due to his lack of physical and 
mental wisdom, needs special attention a d care, including duly legal protection as 
before as after- birth;" it is resolved in sai Convention situations which precisely 
come to protect superior interest of m or children in whom should fall the 
preferential application of the law, Conven i n in which it is understood as child any 
human being minor of eighteen ye~rs old s provides for Article 1, furthermore, is 
seen from next number that included ·ghts at said Convention assure its 
application to each child subject to its juri iction without distinction, independently 
of race, color, sex, language, religion, olitical opinion or of any other kind, 
national, ethnic or social origin, economi I position, physical impediments, birth or 
any other condition if the child, his parentl; or legal representatives, States Parties 
taking all proper measures to secure mi ~ protection, against any discrimination 
or punishment manner because of conditi reason. activities, expressed opinions 
or believes of their parents, guardianship or relatives, and so a series of articles 
whose content eminently seek in every spect and without any discussion to 
safeguard development of said minor c ildren in their physical, mental and 
~=~ ~ ~ u.,L.t ~ motional aspect in an integral and har nic manner, but the most important is 
.::,1>. : ~o 
c; . Willl ~ 
... ' ITS ..., ~ TAA CT A. Ol p 3 f7 
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precisely within all rights pile that may co spond to minor child, is the content 
established in Articles 12 and 13 of the afor entioned Convention. 
In view of the foregoing, be returned produ d documents, previous receipt which 
should be in the records, and in its proper t e be archived this present issue as 
entirely and finally concluded. And in lfillment of circular number 23/2010 
dated March 23 of this year and in gener I resolutions numbers 10-07/2005, 31-
35/2009 and 5-32/2009, issued by Plenu of Judicature Board for the Federal 
District and under provisions contained in icle 28 of Rulings for Institutional 
System of Archives of the Superior C~u . f Justice and Judicature Board for 
the Federal District; __ it __ i __ s__ h __ e __ r ___ eb_._ __ in __ fi_o __ r ....;,-+=---::__,;;:.;._-,;:;.;::~~~:...,;;...----.;_::~-=:.::.: 
deeds in it and that have been roduced action basis and as evidence are 
susceptible of destruction, the foregoing nee these proceedings be over, the 
interested parties should appear· at this urt to apply for devolution of their 
documents within a SIX-MONTH term, co n ed as of the date wherein becomes 
enforceable this interlocutory jud entl leaving the corresponding 
acknowledgment receipt. The foregoing e communicated to the parties or 
interested ones through Judicial Bulletin u r provisions contained in Article 114 
last part of the Code of Civil Procedures. B NOTIFIED. It was decreed and signs 
the Citizen Thirty-Sixth Judge for Do tic Affairs, JORGE RODRIGUEZ-
MURILLO, ATTORNEY, with· attendance f Resolutions Clerk "811 , Martha-
Melida Rodriguez-Mendoza, Attorney, w o authorizes and attests of the act. 
On the left and superior margin appear two ) rubber seals reading: 
Superior Court of Justice for the Federal D~ ·ct- Mexico 
The United Mexican States (National Embl ) 
Domestic Affairs Thirty-Sixth Court 
On the inferior margin appear two illegible s 
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- Electronic signature SICOR/TSJDF ending- (An electronic chain) 
- Electronic signature SICORfTSJDF ending (An electronic chain) 
On Judicial Bulletin No. 24 correspondin to February 08, 2013 it was made 
publication by Law. For the records. On ebruary 11, 2013 previous summons 
became enforceable. 
On the right inferior margin appear two (2) ber seals reading: 
Superior Court of Justice for the Federal Di t ict- Mexico 
The United Mexican States (National Embl ) 
Domestic Affairs Thirty-Sixth Court 
*"**"'***** 
Electronic signature SICOR/TSJDF begl n ng-lnstance: Domestic Affairs Thirty-Sixth 
Court. File: 1472/2007. Clerk: '!B11• De : resolution published on March 05 2013. 
Signatory: JF36SB. NAS: 5109-3158-5415- 63-464. 
- Electronic signature SICORfTSJDF beginnl -Instance: Domestic Affairs Thirty-Sixth 
Court. File: 1472/2007. Clerk: 11 Bq. Deed: r s lutfon published on February 8, 2013. 
Signatory: JF36SB. NAS: 5109-3158-5415- 63--464. 
INCAUSED DIVORCE, MODIFICATION EMPORARY MEASURES, CHANGE 
OF GUARDIANSHI AND CUSTODY (By its abbreviations) 
FILE: 1472/07 
THE CLERK HEREBY CERTIFIES AND ESTS: That the EIG~T-DAY granted 
term to appe·at the resolution dated Fe ary 08 of this year,: runs from the 
TWELVE THROUGH THE TWENTY- E DAY OF FEBRUARY 2013. I 
CERTIFY. Mexico City, Federal District, a ch 04, 2013. 
(An illegible signature) 
Seen previous certification, it is 
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them. Be notified. Issued and signed by tizen Thirty-Sixth Judge for Domestic 
Affairs, with attendance of Resolutions Cler B", who authorizes and attests. 
(Two illegible signatures} 
Electronic signature SICOR/TSJDF ending {An electronic chain) 
- Electronic signature SICOR/TSJDF ending (An electronic chain) 
on· Judicial Bulletin No. 41 correspond n to March 05, 2013 it was made 
publication by Law. For the records. March 06, 2013 previous summons 
became enforceable. For the records. 
On the right inferior and left margin appear o (2) rubber seals reading: 
Superior Court of Justice for the Federal Di rict - Mexico 
The United Mexican States (National Embl ) 
Domestic Affairs Thirty-Sixth Court 
***** 
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CITIZEN MARTHA-MELIDA IGUEZ-MENDOZA, ATTORNEY, 
RESOLUTIONS CLERK "8 11 FOR THIR -SIXTH COURT FOR DOMESTIC 
AFFAIRS FOR THE FEDERAL DISTRICT, EREBY 
GERTI 
THESE PHOTOCOPIES FAITHFULLY REE TO EACH AND ·ALL OF ITS 
PARTS WHICH ARE AT NECESSARY DIV RCE CIVIL ORDINARY SUIT, FILED 
i 
BY MATAS-VIDAL JUAN-PABLO VE US LIBBEY-AGUILERA SUSAN-
CONSUELO, WITH FILE NUMBER 1472/ 07, ARE ISSUED IN FULFILLMENT 
OF DECREED IN WRIT DATED MAR 04, 2013, COMPRISED OF FIVE 
USEFUL PAGES, DULY SEALED, CO ARED AND SIGNED. ISSUED IN 
MEXICO CITY, FEDERAL DISTRICT, ON 
CITIZEN RESOLUTI NS CLERK "B" 
(An illegible i nature) 
MARTHA-MELIDA RODRIGU -MENDOZA, ATTOR~EY 
On the right inferior and left margin appear o (2) rubber seals reading: 
Superior Court of Justice for the Federal Di ·ct- Mexico 
The United Mexican States (National Embl ) 
Domestic Affairs Thirty-Sixth Court 
****"'***** 
I, Miguel Villalobos, Expert Translator, her y C E RT I F Y: Tharthe foregoing is 
a true and accurate translation into Englis of the document in Spanish language 
produced to me: Judgment Issued by h ·rty-Sixth Court for Domestic Affairs, 
related to file 1472/2007 in connection witl Necessary Divorce Proceedings filed 
by JPMV Vs SCLA, as well certification ,sf ed by Resolutions Clem "B 11 of Thirty-
Sixth Court for Domestic Affairs for th Federal District, to the best of my 
knowledge. 
AND FOR ALL LEGAL PURPOSES AS NTERESTED PARTIES MAY DEEM 
ADVISABLE, I HEREBY ISSUE THIS ERTIFICATION IN MEXICO CITY, 
FEDERAL DISTRICT, ON MAY 17, 2013. 
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Mexico, Distrlto Fe e al a ocho de febrero del ano dos 
- - - Dada nueva cu~t con los presentes autos, y tom 
qua la J_ustfcia debe r pronta y expedita, ya fin de plir cabalmente con 
el princlplo de cong e cla que debe prevalecer en a aclones judlclales, en 
el sentido de qua vez qua se advlerte algun rror lnvoluntario, debe 
correglrse, para no p evalecer en el mismo, por · qua en tal tesitura y 
atendiendo a que d nstanclas de autos se ad rte, qua el senor JUAN 
PABLO MATAS VID , medlante escrito present · o el.once de octubre de 
dos mil slete, en la clalfa de Partes Com(m lvil-Famlliar, demand6 de 
SUSAN CONSUEL IBBEY AGUILERA, en I vra Ordinarta Civil, come 
acci6n principal el I orcio Necesario asf com diversas prestaciones; no 
obstante lo anterfor1 I sefior JUAN PABLO ATAS VIDAi., nuevamente 
lnstaur6 julclo de I de SUSAN CONSUELO 
LIBBEY AGUILERA1 I cual se radico bajo I numero 1529/2010, en el 
Juzgado Vigeslmo C rto de lo Familiar de es H. Tribunal, segun consta de 
las coplas certJficada ue fueron remitidas po el Titular de dicho Juzgado, de 
las que lnoluso ade a se advlerte que en a dlencla de fecha velntlclnco de 
novi~mbre del afto d mll dlez, se dlct6 la oluci6n que conforme a derecho 
procedi6. en la cual dlsolvl6 el vinculo trlmon~I y ademas se dejaron a 
salvo sus derechos dental correspondiente hlcieran 
valer lo que a su erecho correspond en relacl6n a la propuesta y 
contrapropuesta de venlo, por lo que n tal tesltura y atendlendo a que 
coma se puntuallz6 .n lrneas anterfores I accfon prfnclpal del Julclo que nos 
ocupa lo fue el dlvo necesario, por lo ue al estar demostrado que dlcha 
acci6n fue ejercitad or el mlsmo act r e I ncluso ejecutada por diverso 
Juzgador, pues no d e pasar desapercl ldo que del atestado de matrimonlo 
qu~ obra en actuacio (foja 435), con ta la lnscripci6n correspondlente a la 
disolucl6n del vincul atrimonlal, en o case tenemos qua el objeto de su 
acci6n era precisam te la de disolve el vlnculo matrimonial que las une, 
· pues al haber p principal en dlverso . juzgado, lo 
. 
procedente es .!:!.Et!IOJ:14iW1..11U:1.U.nia.Ji~!IL\!.IL!id.!!ILEii.LL!ill.W~!lln...a!at..LW!.t!. pues 
aun y cuando el versas prestacrones accesorias, no 
debemos perder de t ta que dlchas tenslones anexas son con$ecuencla 
de la accl6n principal or ende corren a misma suerte procesal que la accfon 
prlmlgenla. ello aun o a que este uzgador se encuentra jurfdicamente 
impedido para variar I lltls y decretar o resolver respecto de cuestiones que 
son meramente a arias, prate di6 hacerlas valer como derechos 
aut6nomos, clrcuns n la que n~:r impl e que posteriormente pueda reclamar • 
come derechos aut6 mos con cara tar de definitive; por consigulenie SE 
DEJAN SIN EFEC S TODAS CADA UNA DE LAS MEDIDAS 
PROVISIONALES d 
de los menores 
TSJOF/Glcor Paglna 1 d~ J 
.:, .. ~~ 
! 
' i 
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' "Ciudad Jrrdil'ia/ v Consolidacion de /o.r Juicias Omle.s. 
Decidirndo por el Orde11 y la Pa. Social" DE JUSTICIA 
Dl:L OF Trigt!s/1110 Sexto de lo Familiar 
RODRIGO de spell! ,s MATAS LIBBEY a favor de SUSAN CONSUELO i 
LIBBEY AGUIL ; as( coma la PENSION ALIMENTICIA PROVISIONAL 
decretada a favor e SUSAN CONSUELO LIBBEY AGUILERA y de las 
menores SANTIAG · RODRIGO de apellidos MATAS LIBBEY a cargo de 
JUAN PABLO MAT VIDAL; el REGIMEN DE VISITAS Y CONVIVENCIAS 
PROVISIONAL a fa r de JUAN PABLO MATAS VIDAL con sus menores 
hijos SANTIAGO y DRIGO oe apellldos MATAS LIBBEY; y el USO OE LA 
VIVIENDA FAMILI a favor de la senora SUSAN CONSUELO LIBBEY 
AGUILERA y de c!tados infantes, las cuales fueron decretadas en 
en sentencla dei sl 
Famlllar de este H. 
del catorce de diciembre de dos mil siete, mod;ficada 
de mayo de dos mil ocho, por la H. Tercar.3 Sala 
bunal, asf coma la diversa variaci6n de fecha ve:ntid6s 
de octubre de dos ii ocho, realizada por la misma autoridad en cumplimiento 
a la ejecutoria pron n ada por el Juez Novena de Oistrito en Materia Civil en 
el Dlstrito Federal. h ra blen, en el entendldo de que dichas prerrogatiYas las 
podran hacer valer n la via y forma que en derecho procada ante la ali\oridad 
competente para el o y ante el C. Juez que por tumo le corresponda. en el 
entendido de que e do memento se debera salvaguardar el interes superior 
de sus menores hij s ~da vez que conforme a lo dispuesto por el artlculo 4• 
Constitucional, la nvenci6n de los derechos del Nino, la Ley ~ara la 
Proteccl6n de las N i\ s, Nirias y Adolecentes, y la Ley de los Derechor.. de las 
NIHos.y de las Nina , las nli\os tienen derecho a una vlda famlllar en ennonla, 
a ser querldos y r s etado por sus padres y a una sana· convlven;;ia con 
ambos, maxima qu s en ellos en donde d~w~r I~ apllcac!6n prnferente 
del derecho, enten I a par preferenci~ ~ . . · ~ ~ l~-, n que se e:<alte el 
lnteres de los men r s sobre cualquie .~~ ·; ... cendencia de•los ,._.,, ~-
lntereses que sa v guarda este t, -~ jetlvo, que es 
I O :r, 
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para una vlda independl teen soc1edad y ser educado en el esp(ritu de los 
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LA CIUDADANA LICENCIADA M MELIDA RODRIGUEZ 
. MENDOZA SECRETARIA DE ACUERDOS "B" DEL JUZGADO TRIGESIMO 
SEXTO DE LO FAMIUAR DEL DISTRlfTO FEDERAL- - -- - -- - - - - - - -
- -- - --------------------- - - C E R T 111 F I C A - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
LAS PRESENTES COPIAS FOTOSTf TICAS CONCUERDAN FIELMENTE 
EN TODAS Y CADA UNA DE SUS PA ES CON LAS QUE OBRAN EN EL 
JUICIO ORDINARIO CIVIL DIVO CIO NECESARIO PROMOVIDO 
POR MATAS VIDAL JUAN PA O EN CONTRA DE LIBBEY 
AGUILERA SUSAN CONCSUELO, l fON NUMERO DE EXPEDIENTE 
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.~ ,.. ,•: 
. ....... ~ .. ,,~ : '-
i r:_: ~;~:· .'~ ,·:FE'.DERAL A LOS VEINTITRES D~S DEL MES DE ABRIL DEL DOS 
: ~"~!V'_,. ,i\\.,l:\i ~-; n . . __ . 








~010, Mexi~ Independence Bicentennial 
And Centennial of the Mexican Revolution" 
Mexico City., Federal District, at 11:30 A.M. on November 25, 20101 time set for the hearing 
referred to In Article 272 B of1he Code of Civil Procedure, before RODRJOO ALBERTO 
HACES-RODRJOUBZ, 241h acting family Judge, assisted by the conclliation clerk by operatfon 
of law, XOCHITL AV11'1A-RUIZ, who attests to the records of1he DIVORCE 
PROCEEDINGS filed by MAT As-VIDAL JUAN PABLO against LIBBEY-AGUILERA 
SUSAN CONSUELO under case number 1S29/2010, appeared both MATAS-VIDAL JUAN 
PABLO and LIBBEY AGUILERA SUSAN CONSUELO, who jdentify themselves, respectively 
with their voter's identification cards, folio numtien 7849357 and 9643160, issued by lhe Federal 
Election Institute; the acting family judge hereby certifies to have seen such docwnents and 
returned them to the interested parlles. THE BEARING WAS FORMALLY OPBN:ED BY 
THE COURT: Thereupon, the standing of the spouses Is analyzed whereby the petitioner has 
legal standing as shown In hls initial petition for divorce and the record of the Bureau of Vital 
Statistics submitted and the divorcing spouse through the summons served by the process server 
ofthejurisdicdon on September 20, 2010, as well as the answer to such petition filed with this 
Court on October 12, 20 JO. Then. the conclliatlon stage was opened to analyze the natural 
consequences arisina from the dissolution of the bonds of marriage and. in the exercise of the 
right to speak, both parties stated that no settlement may be reached, since the legal status of their 
minor children whose names are SANTIAGO and RODRIGO, both of MA TAS-LmBEY last 
name, are subject to litigation with the 36'11 Mexico City Family Court. Consequently, a request 
is hereby made to continue processing the petition for divorce. THE COURT ADJOURNS the 
hearing and after having analyzed the case records, based on the provisions of Articles 287 of the 
Civil Code, hereby issues the following decree: 
·J 
MEXICO CITY, FEDERAL DISTRICT, NOVEMBER 25t 2010, THIS CASE having come 
to be decided and taking into account that this Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the 
petition for divorce filed by MAT AS-VIDAL JUAN PABLO against LmBEY-AGUJLERA 
SUSAN CONSUELO under case number 1529/2010, pursuant to the provisions of Articles J 56 
(XII) and 1S9 of the Code ofCMI Procedwe for the Federal District, m accordance with Points I 
and II, end Articles 48 (III) and 52 (II) of the Orsanic Law of the Supreme Court of Justice_ In 
addition to the fact that the existence of the maniase and that the standing of the parties are duly 
supported with a certified copy of their marriage certificate, an official documeat which probative 
value Is fully acknowledged. according to Articles 39 and SO of the Civil Code, in coMectfon 
with Articles 327 (IV) and 403 of said Code and, since the provisions of Article 266 of the Civil 
Code for the Federal District, which reads as follows: 
"Divorce dl#o/tJa the marital bonds nnd each spoue a free to ramnn:,,. 
Dl,orcs ,n,o, be requested bJ' an,• onfl or 6olh qomes, upon a pslltlflnjllsd wlt/1 
a t:aurt of law, stating suc/1 sporae'6 dultt1 not to continue In tl,e marriage, nnd / 
I~ 
tL 
Mana r1el Socorro Munsvo Metcho1 
Perno Traduclor a:,to el 





wltbolll tl,s nnd to dale a ground for dharce, provided, nt least one year luu 
e/apled nnce the 1t1t1rrloga:" 
2 
apply to this case. 1he bonds of marriage between MATAS-VIDAL JUAN PABLO and 
LIBBEY-AGUILERA SUSANA CONSUELO are hereby dissolved, whlob marriage was 
entered Into In Mexico City, Federal District. under the SBPARA TION PR.OPBRTY SYSTEM 
on June 26, J 999, with the following registration data: ENTITY 09, DISTRICT 01, BURBAU 
17, CERTIFICATE NO. 436, YEAR 1999, TYPB MA. Both parties are now free to remarry, 
with no Umltadons. Also, both parties hereby state their conformity with the decree issued in this 
cue and, therefore, the decree Is hereby declared as final and conclusive for all legal purposes. 
ACCOJdlngly, an official communication to the Dl~ctor ~r the Bmeau ofVllal Statistics of this 
City is ordered to be remitted so that the Director may make the respective annotations iefened to 
in Article 29 J of the ct vii Code. With respect to the proposal and counterproposal of a 
settlement agreement submitted by the parties, their rights me left intact so that. If any, they may 
exercise their rights by fllfns an ancillary proceeding. A set or a certified copy of this hearing Is 
issued to each of the parties, prior receipt of the payment and explanation of the reason for 
obtaining such copy. Thereupon, the hearing ls adjourned at 12: 1 S P .M. on the date, month and 
year set forth above, and the parties involved have hereunto set their hand, along with the Judge 
and the concWatlon c!er)4 who attest this instrument. 
~ t11a underafanltd, Ma. del Socano Munlve Salcbor, SPANlmueNGUSH axpa,t tranafatar, heleby certffrihat, 
ID1118Nltaf1111' bov.!edpaml llallil~ U.,fOl8&0kla lalnlaad Cllll'lllllll:,::a• lllonaOIP&a&aftlm 
c=umentrn 0ta~ 1ana11a;e whfl:fl tadacbed hereto. tJ[_____ 
Mmlco cu,, Duc:embar s, 2010. ___ __,.::;.z;,_ __ _ 
Mart!!I :,c,1 Socor:o MurtM! Meichr· 
Perllo Traduc101 ant<: el 
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Utah Code 
788-13-102 Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Abandoned" means left without provision for reasonable and necessary care or supervision. 
(2) "Child" means an individual under 18 years of age and not married. 
(3) "Child custody determination" means a judgment, decree, or other order of a court providing for 
the legal custody, physical custody, or parent-time with respect to a child. The term includes 
a permanent, temporary, initial, and modification order. The term does not include an order 
relating to child support or other monetary obligation of an individual. 
(4) "Child custody proceeding" means a proceeding in which legal custody, physical custody, or 
parent-time with respect to a child is an issue. The term includes a proceeding for divorce, 
separation, neglect, abuse, dependency, guardianship, paternity, termination of parental rights, 
and protection from domestic violence, in which the issue may appear. The term does not 
include a proceeding involving juvenile delinquency, contractual emancipation, or enforcement 
under Part 3, Enforcement. 
(5) "Commencement" means the filing of the first pleading in a proceeding. 
(6) "Court" means an entity authorized under the law of a state to establish, enforce, or modify a 
child custody determination. 
(7) "Home state" means the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent 
for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody 
proceeding. In the case of a child less than six months of age, the term means the state in 
which the child lived from birth with any of the persons mentioned. A period of temporary 
absence of any of the mentioned persons is part of the period. 
(8) "Initial determination" means the first child custody determination concerning a particular child. 
(9) "Issuing court" means the court that makes a child custody determination for which 
enforcement is sought under this chapter. 
(10) "Issuing state" means the state in which a child custody determination is made. 
(11) "Modification" means a child custody determination that changes, replaces, supersedes, or is 
otherwise made after a previous determination concerning the same child, whether or not it is 
made by the court that made the previous determination. 
(12) "Person" includes government, governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, or any 
other legal or commercial entity. 
(13) "Person acting as a parent" means a person, other than a parent, who: 
(a) has physical custody of the child or has had physical custody for a period of six consecutive 
months, including any temporary absence, within one year immediately before the 
commencement of a child custody proceeding; and 
(b) has been awarded legal custody by a court or claims a right to legal custody under the law of 
this state. 
(14) "Physical custody" means the physical care and supervision of a child. 
(15) "State" means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United 
States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States. 
(16) "Tribe" means an Indian tribe, or band, or Alaskan Native village which is recognized by 
federal law or formally acknowledged by a state. 
(17) "Writ of assistance" means an order issued by a court authorizing law enforcement officers to 
take physical custody of a child. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session 
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Utah Code 
788-13-11 O Communication between courts. 
(1) A court of this state may communicate with a court in another state concerning a proceeding 
arising under this chapter. 
(2) The court may allow the parties to participate in the communication. If the parties are not able 
to participate in the communication, the parties shall be given the opportunity to present facts 
and legal arguments before a decision on jurisdiction is made. 
(3) A communication between courts on schedules, calendars, court records, and similar matters 
may occur without informing the parties. A record need not be made of t!Jat communication. 
(4) Except as provided in Subsection (3), a record shall be made of the communication. The 
parties shall be informed promptly of the communication and granted access to the record. 
(5) For the purposes of this section, "record" means information that is inscribed on a tangible 
medium or that which is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in 
perceivable form. A record includes notes or transcripts of a court reporter who listened to a 
conference call between the courts, an electronic recording of a telephone call, a memorandum 
or an electronic record of the communication between the courts, or a memorandum or an 
electronic record made by a court after the communication. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session 
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Utah Code 
788-13-112 Cooperation between courts -- Preservation of records. 
(1) A court of this state may request the appropriate court of another state to: 
(a) hold an evidentiary hearing; 
{b) order a person to produce or give evidence under procedures of that state; 
(c) order that an evaluation be made with respect to the custody of a child involved in a pending 
proceeding; 
(d) forward to the court of this state a certified copy of the transcript of the record of the hearing, 
the evidence otherwise pres_ented, and any evaluation prepared in compliance with the 
request; and 
(e) order a party to a child custody proceeding or any person having physical custody of the child 
to appear in the proceeding with or without the child. 
(2) Upon request of a court of another state, a court of this state may: 
(a) hold a hearing or enter an order described in Subsection (1 ); or 
(b) order a person in this state to appear alone or with the child in a custody proceeding in 
another state. 
(3) A court of this state may condition compliance with a request under Subsection (2)(b) upon 
assurance by the other state that travel and other necessary expenses will be advanced or 
reimbursed. If the person who has physical custody of the child cannot be served or fails to 
obey the order, or it appears the order will be ineffective, the court may issue a warrant of arrest 
against the person to secure his appearance with the child in the other state. 
(4) Travel and other necessary and reasonable expenses incurred under Subsections (1) and (2) 
may be assessed against the parties according to the law of this state. 
(5) A court of this state shall preserve the pleadings, orders, decrees, records of hearings, 
evaluations, and other pertinent records with respect to a child custody proceeding until the 
child attains 18 years of age. Upon appropriate request by a court or law enforcement official of 
another state, the court shall forward a certified copy of these records. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session 
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Utah Code 
788-13-201 Initial child custody jurisdiction. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 78B-13-204, a court of this state has jurisdiction to 
make an initial child custody determination only if: 
(a) this state is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding, 
or was the home state of the child within six months before the commencement of the 
proceeding and the child is absent from this state but a parent or person acting as a parent 
continues to live in this state; 
(b) a court of another state does not have jurisdiction under Subsection (1 )(a}, or a court of the 
home state of the child has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this state is the 
more appropriate forum under Section 78B-13-207 or 78B-13-208; and 
(i) the child and the child's parents, or the child and at least one parent or a person acting as a 
parent have a significant connection with this state other than mere physical presence; and 
(ii) substantial evidence is available in this state concerning the child's care, protection, training, 
and personal relationships; 
(c) all courts having jurisdiction under Subsection (1 )(a) or (b) have declined to exercise 
jurisdiction on the ground that a court of this state is the more appropriate forum to determine 
the custody of the child under Section 78B-13-207 or 78B-13-208; or 
(d) no state would have jurisdiction under Subsection (1 )(a), (b ), or (c). 
(2) Subsection (1) is the exclusive jurisdictional basis for making a child custody determination by a 
court of this state. 
(3) Physical presence of, or personal jurisdiction over, a party or a child is neither necessary nor 
sufficient to make a child custody determination. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session 
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Utah Code 
788-13-206 Simultaneous proceedings. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 788-13-204, a court of this state may not exercise 
its jurisdiction under this chapter if at the time of the commencement of the proceeding a 
proceeding concerning the custody of the child had been previously commenced in a court 
of another state having jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this chapter, unless the 
proceeding has been terminated or is stayed by the court of the other state because a court of 
this state is a more convenient forum under Section 788-13-207. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided in Section 788-13-204, a court of this state, before_ hearing 
a child custody proceeding, shall examine the court documents and other information 
supplied by the parties pursuant to Section 788-13-209. If the court determines that a child 
custody proceeding was previously commenced in a court in another state having jurisdiction 
substantially in accordance with this chapter, the court of this state shall stay its proceeding 
and communicate with the court of the other state. If the court of the state having jurisdiction 
substantially in accordance with this chapter does not determine that the court of this state is a 
more appropriate forum, the court of this state shall dismiss the proceeding. 
(3) In a proceeding to modify a child custody determination, a court of this state shall determine 
whether a proceeding to enforce the determination has been commenced in another state. If a 
proceeding to enforce a child custody determination has been commenced in another state, the 
court may: 
(a) stay the proceeding for modification pending the entry of an order of a court of the other state 
enforcing, staying, denying, or dismissing the proceeding for enforcement; 
(b) enjoin the parties from continuing with the proceeding for enforcement; or 
(c) proceed with the modification under conditions it considers appropriate. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session 
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Utah Code 
788-13-208 Jurisdiction declined by reason of conduct. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 788-13-204 or by other law of this state, if a court of 
this state has jurisdiction under this chapter because a person invoking the jurisdiction has 
engaged in unjustifiable conduct, the court shall decline to exercise its jurisdiction unless: 
(a) the parents and all persons acting as parents have acquiesced in the exercise of jurisdiction; 
(b) a court of the state otherwise having jurisdiction under Sections 788-13-201 through 
788-13-203 determines that this state is a more appropriate forum under Section 788-13-207; 
or 
(c) no other state would have jurisdiction under Sections 788-13-201 through 788-13-203. 
(2) If a court of this state declines to exercise its jurisdiction pursuant to Subsection (1 ), it may 
fashion an appropriate remedy to ensure the safety of the child and prevent a repetition of 
the wrongful conduct, including staying the proceeding until a child custody proceeding is 
commenced in a court having jurisdiction under Sections 788-13-201 through 788-13-203. 
(3) If a court dismisses a petition or stays a proceeding because it declines to exercise its 
jurisdiction pursuant to Subsection (1 ), it shall charge the party invoking the jurisdiction of the 
court with necessary and reasonable expenses including costs, communication expenses, 
attorney fees, investigative fees, expenses for witnesses, travel expenses, and child care 
during the course of the proceedings, unless the party from whom fees are sought establishes 
that the award would be clearly inappropriate. The court may not assess fees, costs, or 
expenses against this state except as otherwise provided by law other than this chapter. 
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788-13-209 Information to be submitted to court. 
(1) In a child custody proceeding, each party, in its first pleading or in an attached affidavit, shall 
give information, if reasonably ascertainable, under oath as to the child's present address, 
the places where the child has lived during the last five years, and the names and present 
addresses of the persons with whom the child has lived during that period. The pleading or 
affidavit shall state whether the party: 
(a) has participated, as a party or witness or in any other capacity, in any other proceeding 
concerning the custody of or parent-time with the child and, if ~o, identify the court, the case 
number of the proceeding, and the date of the child custody determination, if any; 
(b) knows of any proceeding that could affect the current proceeding, including proceedings for 
enforcement and proceedings relating to domestic violence, protective orders, termination 
of parental rights, and adoptions and, if so, identify the court and the case number and the 
nature of the proceeding; and 
(c) knows the names and addresses of any person not a party to the proceeding who has 
physical custody of the child or claims rights of legal custody or physical custody of, or parent-
time with, the child and, if so, the names and addresses of those persons. 
(2) If the information required by Subsection (1) is not furnished, the court, upon its own motion or 
that of a party, may stay the proceeding until the information is furnished. 
(3) If the declaration as to any of the items described in Subsection (1) is in the affirmative, the 
declarant shall give additional information under oath as required by the court. The court may 
examine the parties under oath as to details of the information furnished and other matters 
pertinent to the court's jurisdiction and the disposition of the case. 
(4) Each party has a continuing duty to inform the court of any proceeding in this or any other state 
that could affect the current proceeding. 
(5) If a party alleges in an affidavit or a pleading under oath that the health, safety, or liberty of a 
party or child would be put at risk by the disclosure of identifying information, that information 
shall be sealed and not disclosed to the other party or the public unless the court orders the 
disclosure to be made after a hearing in which the court takes into consideration the health, 
safety, or liberty of the party or child and determines that the disclosure is in the interest of 
justice. 
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